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abstract In a series of papers, a many-minds interpretation of quantum theory
has been developed. The aim in these papers is to present an explicit mathematical
formalism which constitutes a complete theory compatible with relativistic quantum
field theory. In this paper, which could also serve as an introduction to the earlier
papers, three issues are discussed. First, a significant, but fairly straightforward,
revision in some of the technical details is proposed. This is used as an opportunity
to introduce the formalism. Then the probabilistic structure of the theory is revised,
and it is proposed that the experience of an individual observer can be modelled as the
experience of observing a particular, identified, discrete stochastic process. Finally, it
is argued that the formalism can be modified to give a physics in which no constants
are required. Instead, “constants” have to be determined by observation, and are
fixed only to the extent to which they have been observed.
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1. Introduction.
Following von Neumann, the conventional formalism for quantum mechanics pos-
tulates that two quite distinct processes are involved in the time evolution of the
wave-function of a quantum system. Process I – “collapse of the wave-packet” – is an
abrupt change which supposedly occurs as a result of measurements. With appropri-
ate probabilities, it replaces the wave-function by one of the eigenfunctions of some
operator which is being measured. Process II, on the other hand, which is supposed
to govern the system at all other times, is deterministic evolution under some version
of the Schro¨dinger equation. However, no satisfactory account of process I has ever
been given. In particular, it has never made been clear how a “measurement” should
be distinguished from any other physical process, nor, given a measurement, how the
“operator being measured” is to be defined, and nor how the “abrupt” change is to
be made to conform with special relativity. Everett, therefore, made the brilliant
suggestion that process I simply did not occur. Instead, he argued that process II
was sufficient, and that the apparent occurrence of process I was entirely due to the
way in which process II inevitably affected the physical structure of observers. Once
again however, a detailed account was required. In particular, what is the physical
structure of an observer?
For many years now, I have been attempting to answer this question with the
aim of providing a firm technical foundation for Everett’s ideas. There should be no
doubt that such a foundation is required, even in the context of decoherence theory –
the latest and most sophisticated version of the lesson that, as far as correlations to
quasi-classical states of a given macroscopic object are concerned, an entirely quan-
tum universe will, under normal circumstances, appear, for all practical purposes, to
behave classically at the macroscopic level (Giulini et al. (1996)). When that lesson
is absorbed, the problems remain: firstly to characterize unambiguously structures
within such a universe which could provide a foundation for the correlations which
we individually actually experience; and secondly to describe how those structures
themselves can develop with time.
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The details of my work have so far appeared in three papers (Donald (1990, 1992,
1995)). In Donald (1995) in particular, I proposed a “mathematical characterization
of the physical structure of an observer”. This characterization forms part of a hy-
pothesis, the current version of which is presented in the appendix to this paper. The
hypothesis consists of a completely explicit set of definitions for the structure of an
observer and for the set of possible future extensions of such a structure, together
with definitions for the a priori probability of existence of an observer and for the
probability of moving from a given structure to a given extension. In Donald (1990),
with a detailed neurophysiological analysis, I began the work of arguing that humans
do have the proposed type of structure and that the only entities which can with sig-
nificant a priori probability possess such structure at the human level of complexity
are those which we would be prepared to believe might be physical manifestations of
consciousness. In Donald (1992), I gave an axiomatic definition of a priori probabili-
ties for localized observers in quantum theory, in such a way as to be compatible with
special relativity and quantum field theory.
As a whole, the hypothesis constitutes a complete interpretation of quantum
theory. According to this interpretation, an observer has a particular type of physical
structure and the probabilities of changes in that structure (corresponding to new
experiences) are as defined. Our observations of the physical world are explained if
we have the type of physical structure suggested and if the suggested probabilities
are empirically justified. If arguments show that these goals are not achieved, then it
may be possible to save the interpretation by improvements in the hypothesis. In this
paper, I shall present several such improvements. Starting in section 2, I shall review
the hypothesis, step by step, and in sections 3 and 4, I shall explain the changes
which I feel need to be made in the non-probabilistic parts of the hypothesis. Some
elementary models are presented in section 7 in order to elucidate certain aspects of
the interpretation. Although this paper could be read independently, much of the
hypothesis is unchanged from Donald (1995), and explanation of some of the details
is to be found there. Wherever possible, the parts of the hypothesis in this paper
carry the same labels as the corresponding parts of the hypothesis in Donald (1995).
The second purpose of this paper is to revise the probabilistic structure of the
theory. This is a more interesting and fundamental revision as the nature of probabil-
ity in many-minds interpretations has been a matter of some controversy (Lockwood
et al. (1996), Donald (1997)). Given the framework already constructed, the solution
proposed here is conceptually quite simple. In Donald (1992, 1995), a number was
associated with each observer. Those numbers were referred to as “a priori proba-
bilities”, but I do not now believe that, by themselves, those numbers can form an
adequate basis for a theory of observation. In section 5 of this paper therefore, I shall
modify the theory in such a way that it becomes possible to model the experience of
an individual observer as being equivalent to the experience of observing a particular,
identified, stochastic process. In other words, life is like a game of chance.
Once the stochastic process has been defined, it is necessary to show that its
probabilities can be expected to be compatible with observed statistics. In section
6, the nature of probability in a many-minds interpretation is discussed. It is then
3
argued that, with probabilities defined by the stochastic process, a typical modern
human observer will be aware of a world in which quantum theory is accepted and in
which its detailed theoretical predictions are confirmed. In sections 7 and 8, attention
is turned to the observation of individual events with uncertain outcomes. After a
preliminary discussion in section 7, the full complexity of human neural processing is
addressed in section 8.
It will be clear from a glance at the appendix that the proposed hypothesis is
technically sophisticated. It is also speculative. Some elements are more speculative
than others. In my opinion, the details are important, not merely because of the
possibility that they might be correct, but because it is only by accepting the discipline
of trying to construct a complete mathematical framework that one can come to
understand the conceptual ramifications of the many-minds idea and test whether
that idea is coherent. The overall aim is just to provide one theory which constitutes
a complete mathematical framework for a many-minds interpretation and which is
compatible with modern theoretical physics and, of course, with observation. The
complexity of the hypothesis and its speculative nature may in themselves cast light
on the nature of many-minds interpretations.
Even the most speculative of the elements of the hypothesis is fiercely constrained
by the other elements; by the goal of compatibility with quantum field theory, with
special relativity, and with observation; and by the goal of being able to describe
the existence of human observers in the framework of universal quantum theory. In
my view, the difficulty of working out the details has been widely underestimated in
the stream of preliminary sketches for interpretations which have gained popularity
over the years (cf. Bacciagaluppi, Donald, and Vermaas (1995), Dowker and Kent
(1996)). It has been my experience in the development of the present theory that
apparently minor problems when pursued have usually turned into major problems.
However, such problems become opportunities, when they force the refinement of the
interpretation. Although it seems unlikely this process will be sufficient to lead to a
theory which is unique in all its details; it can perhaps lead us further than might
be expected. Except where grounds are given for modifying the details of Donald
(1995), the many versions of the hypothesis discarded during its development to date
are absent from this work. These failures and the difficulty in moving beyond them
give me no doubt, not only that the present hypothesis could also be shown to be
unsatisfactory, but even that unless there is some truth in the many-minds idea, then
any version of it will ultimately be shown to be flawed in its detail.
If the version of the many-minds idea presented here is true, then there is a
law of nature which states that to any conscious entity there corresponds a physical
structure characterized by the hypothesis. In other words, the hypothesis is proposed
as a physical law in the same way that the standard model in particle physics might
be so proposed. The only way to find a physical law is to try to describe the physical
world in some particularly elegant fashion. In the case of the hypothesis, the idea is
to provide a high-level abstract description of the functioning of a human brain; a
description that is sufficiently abstract to be definable entirely within the mathematics
of axiomatic quantum field theory. The elegance comes in trying to find the most
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simple such description sufficiently complete to express everything about the physical
structure of the observer which is relevant to his or her mental life. Nevertheless, it
should be realized that even if a physical law holds, there is no guarantee that it is
sufficiently elegant to be distinguished from all alternative possibilities – either minor
variations or radical replacements.
The search for an elegant description, refined by specific problems, is demon-
strated in sections 3 and 4. Here, for example, we meet a problem in individuating
observers. This is solved by a mathematical translation of the fact that individual
human brains are (usually) spatially separated from each other. The solution is ele-
gant in that it fits naturally into the overall mathematical structure, but variations
in the details of the solution are certainly possible.
At present, the formalism is compatible with a fixed Lorentz invariant quantum
field theory on Minkowski space which satisfies the Haag-Kastler-Schroer axioms.
In section 9, I shall speculate about further changes to the formalism and argue
that, while remaining consistent with observation, one could allow for observation-
dependent variations in the underlying quantum field theory. This suggests the possi-
bility of a physics without physical constants and may be a preliminary step towards
compatibility with more sophisticated physical theories.
Eventually, I hope that some version of the present formalism might be useful in
the development of axiomatic structures for theories like noncommutative geometry or
quantum gravity or string theory. There are two general principles at the heart of my
work which may make it useful in this context. These principles are that the formalism
should define a minimal structure for an observer and that an observer should be
specified in entirely abstract terms as a developing pattern of information. The result
is that the formalism places minimal constraints upon the governing physical theory
and is potentially adaptable to be compatible with the most exotic mathematical
framework; requiring ultimately only the possibility of defining the structures used in
minimal descriptions of individual observers.
As our physical theories have become more sophisticated, it has constantly been
found that in order to accomodate apparently esoteric empirical results, or even just
theoretical advances, technical concepts which had once been considered fundamental
have come to be seen as derived. If our idea of the world was based on the idea
of a collection of particles with definite properties, then our entire philosophy may
have been put at risk by the realization that particles do not have definite proper-
ties. In mathematical quantum field theory, not only the definite properties, but even
the particles themselves have become derived concepts useful only in certain obser-
vational situations; including of course, scattering experiments. Wave-functions and
eigenfunctions also cannot be considered as fundamental, unless at the level of the
entire universe. It is thus to the advantage of the present formalism that it depends on
generalizable concepts like patterns of spacetime relations, continuous paths, local ge-
ometry, and quantum states in the mathematical sense (rather than wave-functions).
In terms of such high-level concepts it may be possible, (and will perhaps be required
by quantum gravity), to allow even for time itself to appear only as a derived concept
at the level of the observer. Allowing observation-dependent quantum field theory, as
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is proposed in section 9, may be a hint of the kind of formal flexibility which may be
needed for the implementation of this idea.
In Donald (1997), the goals of this paper were announced and an introduction
to “many-minds” interpretations was provided, together with discussions of and ref-
erences to some alternative formulations.
2. An abstract model of a finite information-processing structure.
The first step in the interpretation is the modelling of an observer as a finite
information-processing structure. This step is based on the preparatory intuition
that human cognition works through patterns of neural firing developing over time.
As a first approximation, a neuron can be thought of as a two-status entity: either a
signal is passing along the neuron and it is “firing”, or no signal is passing and the
neuron is “quiescent”. A human brain contains a finite number of neurons (around
1011) and the preliminary idea would be that a complete description of everything
relevant to the workings of the brain as the embodiment of a mind at a given moment,
could be given by describing the pattern of neural firings in that brain over the lifetime
of the person involved, up until the moment in question.
There are many problems with this idea. From a physical point of view, neu-
rons are macroscopic objects. Whether or not they only have two statuses as far as
information processing is concerned, the family of quantum mechanical states which
they visit over time is much too complex to express a simple binary opposition. To
deal with this problem, it is necessary to focus attention not on neurons, but on
substructures within neurons which do have a pair of quantum-mechanically simple
statuses, directly tied to the firing or quiescent status of the neuron in they are con-
tained. I call such substructures “switches”. Much attention is devoted in Donald
(1990, 1995) to identifying and characterizing possible switches. An example might
be a small piece of neural wall, whose electrical polarization will express the status of
the encompassing neuron.
It is the switch statuses which are the “classical facts” or the “measured observ-
ables” of the present interpretation. In the hypotheses of the previous papers of this
series, the status of each switch was required to be “observed”, or specified, or deter-
mined, exactly once per change of status and so, with a rather sloppy use of language,
it was possible to blur the distinction between determinations of switch status and
changes of switch status. The word “switching” was used to refer to both. However,
as will be explained in section 6 of the present paper, it now appears necessary, in or-
der to achieve a satisfactory probabilistic structure, to allow the possibility of switch
status being determined more than once per change. For this reason, the distinction
can no longer be blurred, and the fundamental events will now be referred to as “de-
terminations of switch status” or “determinations” rather than as “switchings”. It
should be stressed that this is merely a linguistic amendment; no change is actually
being proposed in the nature of the fundamental events. Patterns of switch status
determinations will continue to be referred to as “switching patterns” or “switching
structures”.
Many-minds interpretations are conceptually radical, so it should not be surpris-
ing that words must be used with some care. For example, a determination that
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a switch has status C in some region is not something chosen by the observer. “A
determination” is being used in the sense of “a finding” rather than “a decision”. In
fact it is very difficult entirely to avoid using language which gives an impression of an
observer’s future possibilities as being either, on the one hand, chosen or shaped by
the observer; or, on the other hand, merely an expression of the observer’s ignorance
about a pre-determined unique future. Many-worlds theory rejects the latter idea
because of the difficulty of constructing a theory of physical “wave-packet collapse”
compatible, for example, with the experimental evidence for special relativity and for
the violation of Bell’s inequalities. The former idea should also be rejected if possible,
because it makes the causal effects of an observer unphysical. The present theory is
an attempt to show that both of these ideas can consistently be rejected; leaving us
instead with the idea of the possible immediate futures of an observer at any moment,
as being given by a well-defined set of possible extensions of his current history, each
of which will occur with its own well-defined probability.
Determinations are defined precisely by the hypothesis, but in essence they are
the elementary facts from which the observer’s world (or “history”) is constructed.
The facts are of the form that it appears to the observer as if a certain switch had a
definite given status in a region of spacetime which is related in a given way to the
other regions in which switch status is determined. At the neural level, a sequence
of determinations of the polarization of a patch of neural membrane might be de-
scribed in the form LLHLLL, where L indicates that the electric potential inside the
membrane is lower than that outside, and H the opposite. This sequence would be
indicative of one period of neural firing (the H), preceded and followed by periods of
quiescence. For an abstract switch, a corresponding set of six switch determinations
might be described by CCOCCC with C for “closed” and O for “open”.
For the complete description of the mental processes of an observer, we shall
require more geometrical information about a set of switch determinations than mere
time-ordering. This brings us back to the idea of “a pattern” of neural firing (or more
precisely “a pattern” of switch determinations). As will be explained below, it is
essential for the understanding of probability that only a finite amount of information
be required to describe an observer. The definition of a pattern which I introduce
and discuss in Donald (1995) amounts to a listing, called a “docket”, of the spacetime
relations between the spacetime sets in which switch statuses are determined. Thus
a docket is a geometrical structure in spacetime defined as an equivalence class of
ordered sequences (Ai)
M
i=1 of suitable spacetime sets. Two such sequences (Ai)
M
i=1
and (Bi)
M
i=1 will have the same docket if they have the same spacetime, or causal,
arrangement – in other words, if, for every pair i, j, Bi is in the past of/spacelike
to/in the future of Bj exactly when Ai is in the past of/spacelike to/in the future
of Aj – and if one sequence can be continuously deformed into the other while the
arrangement is essentially unaltered. With M finite, only finitely many dockets are
possible for M sets.
These ideas are sufficient to define an abstract “pattern of switch determina-
tions”. This provides us with part A of the hypothesis in the appendix, according to
which the structure of a mind is defined by an ordered sequence of N switches and M
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determinations of status, by a docket d which defines the spacetime relations between
the determinations, and by a function ϕ which defines the switch ϕ(m) which has its
status determined in the mth determination. The status of switch n is determined
Kn times and its k
th determination is determination number jn(k). Taken together,
M , N , d, and ϕ define a “minimal ordered switching structure SO(M,N, d, ϕ)”. In
part B3 of the hypothesis, irrelevant labels are removed from SO(M,N, d, ϕ) to define
a “minimal switching structure S(M,N, [d, ϕ])”. All sorts of philosophical questions
arise with the claim that such a definition is adequate as a description of everything
which is relevant about the behaviour of a brain in its functioning as the embodiment
of a mind. These questions are discussed at length in Donald (1995, 1997). The
only shortcut I can offer to that philosophical discussion is to emphasize the following
points:
a. Such an abstract pattern is an abstract analog of a pattern of neural firing and
human cognition does seem to function through such a pattern.
b. A satisfactory theory of probabilities depends on only a finite number of distinct
future possibilities being available to any observer within a finite period.
c. In the context of an interpretation of quantum mechanics without a physical
process of wave-packet collapse, there is no direct way to identify the sequence
of quantum states occupied by a warm wet human brain. It is, for example,
extremely difficult to see how a natural “preferred basis” of brain wave-functions
could be identified. Because of this, we cannot make the assumption, inevitable
in classical physics, that a brain is simply something given; “out there”; existing
in itself; a ready-made vessel for the mind. Thus quantum mechanics requires
us to characterize the essential structure of a brain before we can identify the
physical manifestations of such structures.
3. Constraints and temporal development for switching structures.
Even if it is accepted that for suitable M , N , d, and ϕ, the definition of
S(M,N, [d, ϕ]) gives an adequate “description of everything which is relevant about
the behaviour of a brain in its functioning as the embodiment of a mind”, it is not
the case that every possible switching structure S(M,N, [d, ϕ]) is a description of
something which we could interpret as such an embodiment. Indeed most switching
structures are random and presumably meaningless. A satisfactory many-minds the-
ory should define a priori probabilities so that the futures of human minds are not
dominated by randomness. In order to do this, various constraints are imposed in
the hypothesis on the physical manifestations of switching patterns. This disallows
some manifestations which are not like individual functioning human brains; for ex-
ample, because they are spatially disconnected. This section introduces some of these
constraints. The temporal development of structures is also discussed.
Pruning the apparently vast set of “observer-like” structures may be the most
difficult part of developing a many-minds theory. There is always a temptation to
abandon this task; to suggest that quantum theory should be viewed simply a theory
of correlations (Wheeler (1957), Saunders (1996), Mermin (1998)), and that every
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interaction between different physical systems is a species of observation. One draw-
back of this suggestion is that it provides no hope of understanding our own personal
physical structures as observers. After all, the information-processing structure of the
human brain appears not to depend on anything like the full complexity of the phys-
ical interactions of the atoms of which the brain is formed; we usually think of most
of that complexity as mere thermal noise. Moreover, at least in relativistic quantum
field theory, it is not all clear how “physical systems” are to be identified; even the
idea of “an electron” is not without ambiguity. The most serious problem, however,
in a proposal which at each moment, provides an infinite variety of “observer-like”
entities, is that it is not clear that anything remains of the concept of temporal succes-
sion except for a vague idea about similarity between past and future (cf. Bell (1976,
1981), Butterfield (1996)).
Given the problems with the idea that there are no rules constraining the defini-
tion of the physical structure of observers, we must either abandon the many-minds
interpretation or propose some rules. Of course, such a proposal will only be correct,
if the rules are facts about reality or physical laws, rather than mere invention. The
main test of whether or not they could be factual will consist of asking whether or
not they are consistent and allow us to explain belief in quantum theory. If they pass
this test, then they can annex all the empirical evidence usually taken to support
the (hopelessly inconsistent) conventional theory. However, as mentioned in the in-
troduction, physical laws are also frequently required to be, in some sense, “elegant”,
or “simple”, or even “beautiful”. In the present context, this might mean something
like “unfussy” or “not subject to special conditions”, and, in these terms, it could
be suggested that the constraints introduced in this section are ugly and that the
hypothesis might be, at best, accurate phenomenological description rather than fun-
damental law. That is for the reader to decide, and to improve on if s/he can. It
should be noted, however, that in compensation for these constraints, not only does
one gain a possibly complete and consistent interpretation of quantum theory, but
also, as we shall see in section 9, one may be able to reduce, perhaps to zero, the
vast amount of information which would be conventionally required to specify exact
initial conditions. Although initial conditions and physical laws are neatly separated
in conventional physics, this does not mean that they should be ignored in the total
count of the complexity or fussiness of a theory.
In Donald (1995), I mentioned the possibility of using the details of the theory
with its allowance for fluctuations in switch states to construct arbitrary switching
structures with a priori probability of around (1.14)−M and I suggested that these
structures were unimportant because their a priori probability was so low. These
structures were referred to as “artificial” because they are not reflections of patterns
of causal correlations implicit in the universal quantum state. Unfortunately, I now
think, that with the version of the hypothesis presented in that paper, the future of
a structure S(M,N, [d, ϕ]) which did describe a human brain would be dominated
by the large number of possible ways in which small numbers of new short-term
artificial switches could arise. This brings us to the first of the new constraints to
be imposed in this paper: a requirement of homogeneity between switches, which
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will make negligible the total probability of such occurrences. The details of this
requirement will be discussed in the next section.
Another type of possible switching structure which would satisfy the definition
of S(M,N, [d, ϕ]) could be formed by the amalgamation of the switching structures
describing several individuals and would describe the brains of all those individuals
simultaneously. This would mean, for example, Alice and Bob existing not only
as separate individuals: as “Alice” and as “Bob”, but also as the joint individual
“Alice-n’-Bob”. Now the answer to the question “What would it be like to be “Alice-
n’-Bob”?” is simply that it would be like being Alice and Bob separately but in the
same “world”. At first sight, one might then think that “Alice-n’-Bob” would be a
better description of reality than the individual-minds theory in which Alice has her
world and Bob separately has his. However, inevitably one is led by this idea to try
describe the entire human race by one vast joint structure and I do not believe that
this can be done satisfactorily. There would be correspondingly vast ambiguities in
such a structure; there would be an uncertainty of at least a twenty-fifth of a second
(the light travel time to the antipodes) in the specification of an instant in time for
such a structure; and the problem of whether humans also exist as individuals would
arise. In order to rule out such joint structures (at least with significant probability),
I therefore propose in this paper a modification of the hypothesis which will force a
switching structure to be manifested by a connected set of switches. This also will be
discussed in detail in the next section.
I shall refer to the problem of the extension of a switching structure from one
individual to more than one as the “breeding problem”. Another problem relating
to the existence of superfluous structures was introduced in Donald (1995). This
was the “trimming problem” which arises from the possibility of taking a switching
structure describing a single individual and removing a few of the switches to leave a
structure which may have higher a priori probability but very little less information.
The problem is to decide which of these structures should be associated with a given
person. The trimming problem will be resolved in this paper by modifying the order
in which structures are allowed to develop and the definition of a priori probability
so that trim structures will tend to become fuller.
The development of structures is governed by part B of the hypothesis, which
defines what it means for one structure to be an immediate successor to another. Two
different ways in which a structure can be extended are allowed by part B. Either there
is a single new determination of the status of an existing switch (B1), or a new switch
is introduced (B2). However, it is required by A5 that, for a switch to be part of the
structure, it needs to have opened and closed at least twice. Thus any new switch
must have at least four determinations of status. If new switches could be added
with fewer determinations, then all the constraints imposed by parts C to F of the
hypothesis would not be expressed and an unrestricted increase in switch numbers
would be possible. Because four determinations are needed in B2, the introduction
of a new switch cannot be instantaneous. This means that, although in general part
of the meaning of a human switching structure will include a “psychological present
moment”, successors of such a structure may involve new determinations of status
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localized before that moment. Otherwise, the entire structure would have to be
reduced for a certain interval to a single switch. In the case of B1, such extensions
back in time are also permitted. The single new determination can be made at any
time during the history of the switch; subject to the later constraint (C13) which
prevents a pile-up of re-determinations of status.
In general, the possibility of extension back in time resolves the trimming prob-
lem by allowing growth to occur wherever it is possible. This means that status
determinations of high a priori probability can become part of the switching struc-
ture before earlier determinations of low a priori probability, but that those earlier
determinations can nevertheless still eventually be included. However, a fundamental
arrow of time remains built into the theory both by the forward direction of switch
paths (part C) and by the inductive definition of a priori probability (part G). In sec-
tion 8, the existence of the “psychological present” will be explained as an empirical
consequence of the theory.
4. Manifestations of switching structures in spacetime.
Once switching structures and their successors have been defined, the remaining
parts of the hypothesis are concerned with the definition of probabilities. This requires
the introduction of the set of “physical manifestations” of a structure. In parts C to
F, individual manifestations are considered. In part G, the probability of existence
of an abstract structure is defined by maximizing the probabilities of its individual
manifestations.
An individual manifestation, defined in G1 as a pair ((σm)
M
m=1,W ), can be
thought of as a quantum world in which an appropriate pattern of switch behaviour
exists. It is a world defined by a sequence of quantum states ((σm)
M
m=1 in part F)
and by a sequence of geometrical information (W in part C). Taken together, these
describe the switches moving through spacetime and changing in status in such a
way as to model the abstract structure defined in parts A and B. In developing a
many-minds interpretation of quantum theory, it is natural to construct such possible
models of an observer’s world. They correspond closely to conventional ideas about
reality in quantum physics and use both of von Neumann’s processes – determinis-
tic evolution in the definition of the Heisenberg picture states, and “collapse” in the
sequential change from one state to another. Nevertheless, ultimately, these conven-
tional ideas break down. Each switching structure has continuously many possible
individual manifestations, each of which describes how the world might be for the
observer whose experiences are constituted by the given structure. But there is no
way to choose between these possibilities. Only the structure is experienced. All
of the possible worlds enter into the universal quantum state in similar ways. They
are all indistinguishable as far as the observer is concerned. All will be used here
in the calculation of a priori probability. They are not “real” worlds, neither are
they “worlds” in the Everett or DeWitt sense (DeWitt and Graham (1973)); they are
just mathematical constructs which mirror the unique experience of a single observer
characterized by one completely-defined abstract switching structure. It is, of course,
no more than a hypothesis that the total set of all such possibilities – the equivalence
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classes of individual manifestations – should be relevant to a complete interpretation
of quantum theory. Whether that hypothesis is successful is for the reader to judge.
Part C of the hypothesis is concerned with the idea of a switch as a two-status
object moving through spacetime and having determined status in specified regions.
Thus, in part C, for each individual manifestation, a specific sequence of sets (Ai)
M
i=1
is identified which has the docket d defined in part A. For n = 1, . . . , N , a spacetime
path xn(t) is defined on a parameter interval [0, Tn]. This is the path along which
switch n moves, although it is only “in operation” in a subinterval [Sn, Tn]. The
switch status is determined at parameter times tnk for k = 1, . . . , Kn. At parameter
time t, switch n occupies the spacetime region Λn(t). Λn(t) is a Poincare´ transform,
defined by xn(t) and by a path Ln(t) in the restricted Lorentz group, of a set Λ. Λ
is the set, common to all the switches, at which comparisons are made. C6 demands
that the path xn(t) followed by switch n and the boosts imposed on that switch by
Ln(t) be consistent.
The requirement of connectedness which is the fundamental step in making joint
switching structures like “Alice-n’-Bob” of negligible probability is imposed by part
C10 of the hypothesis. This requires that between any two spacelike separated points
within regions where switch status is determined, there is a spacelike path lying
entirely within the spacetime set traced out by switch paths. By itself, however, C10
will not solve the breeding problem. No constraint is imposed on the shape of the
set Λ. By giving Λ very long fine hairs, it would be possible to connect arbitrarily
distant switches without any significant loss of a priori probability. This possibility is
ruled out by C11 which requires that, at any moment, only a maximum number (C)
of other switches can contact a given individual switch.
C – the “contact number” – may be the most arbitrary part of the entire hypoth-
esis. Some value has to be given to C, not only for the breeding problem, but also
to prevent switches piling up on top of each other. In Donald (1995), only the latter
problem was considered, and C was defined to be zero. Now, however, I propose that
C should be defined to be thirteen. Thirteen is one more than the maximum number
of identical spheres which can make simultaneous contact with another sphere of the
same size in three dimensions. Thus thirteen allows for a switch to have a maximal
number of nearest neighbours, and a replacement.
The fact that observers are localized is fundamental in the proposed interpreta-
tion. An observer only interacts with and has information about limited aspects of
the universe. At the level of an individual geometrical manifestationW , these aspects
are defined by a limited set B(W ) of observables (bounded, but not necessarily self-
adjoint operators) on which the quantum states of the switches are defined. The sets
B(W ) are defined by parts D1 and D2 of the hypothesis, while in part D3, quantum
states on general sets of bounded operators are defined. As required for a theory of
localized entities, the states in D3 are not necessarily pure.
The quantum state of a switch when it is in the spacetime region Λ will be on
the local algebra A(Λ) – the algebra of all observables measurable within Λ (Haag
(1992)). The Poincare´ transformation (xn(t), Ln(t)) is used to transform the state
of a switch in Λn(t) back to Λ. The two possible statuses (“open” and “closed”)
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of switch n are defined by two orthogonal projections Pn and Qn in A(Λ). B(W )
is generated from transforms of the Pn and Qn and from the algebras A(Λn(t)) for
t ∈ [Sn, Tn].
In parts E and F the quantum states of the switches are characterized. The
first four items in part F are a formal expression of the idea, introduced in Donald
(1990), that “A switch is something spatially localized, the quantum state of which
moves between a set of open states and a set of closed states, such that every open
state differs from every closed state by more than the maximum difference within
any pair of open states or any pair of closed states.” These open and closed states
are the states in which the switch status is determined. They will be referred to as
“determination states”.
The final item of part F requires that the determination states cannot change
arbitrarily between different switches. This is the homogeneity requirement referred
to in the previous section. New switches are only allowed if they have determination
states which are close to the corresponding states of some other contemporary switch
in the structure. The requirement is sufficiently loose to permit some variation in
determination states – as is neccessitated, for example, by changes in neural temper-
ature – but it is also tight enough to disallow artificial switches. The loss of a priori
probability caused by a single arbitrary collapse sufficient to mimic switching can be
as low as (1.14)−1, but only if the switch mimicked is of a very simple type. However,
the most likely ways in which structures of human complexity can arise is through
the causal correlations within a functioning brain in which the switches are something
like patches of neural membrane. With the homogeneity requirement, the determi-
nation states of the switches are no longer independent. Artifical switches, imposed
in a functioning brain, must also involve collapses to patches of neural membrane.
These will be of extremely low a priori probability unless the membrane required is
already in existence and has, in conventional terms, some possibility of behaving in
the required fashion.
In part E, the identity of the switches over time is considered. As has already been
mentioned, identity over time has frequently been seen as a problem in many-worlds
and many-minds interpretations of quantum theory (Bell (1976, 1981), Butterfield
(1996)). Part E defines the path followed by a switch through spacetime as being
that path along which the local quantum state changes least.
In parts E and F, finite sequences of quantum states are considered. This is a
reflection of the fundamental problem of the interpretation of quantum mechanics
that although quantum states can be found at any instant which provide apparently
accurate descriptions of any physical system, compatible with all that is observed
about the system at that instant, that compatibility property is not preserved over
time. This is the Schro¨dinger cat problem – a quantum state can be found to describe
the cat as it is observed at the beginning of the experiment, but, by the end of the
experiment, the time propagation of that state is sure to be some sort of superposition
or mixture, which is neither compatible with a live cat, nor with a dead cat.
Similarly, in the human brain, a switch can have a well-defined quantum state
at one instant, but thermal and other fluctuations will soon result in that quantum
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state describing a mixture of switch statuses. The quantum state must be then
replaced (or “collapsed”) in order (loosely speaking) to purify the mixture. In order
to avoid an analogue of the quantum Zeno paradox (Donald (1992)), the number
of such replacements must be limited, and it is natural to allow one replacement per
determination of switch status – “one collapse per measurement”. Each such change of
state should allow the path xn(t) of switch n to change direction. However, in Donald
(1995) the path of switch n was only allowed to alter in response to a determination
of the status of switch n itself. This was a mistake and resulted in an inadequate
hypothesis, because it is possible for the observer to gain information from only a
part of his brain which would affect how he sees his entire brain moving.
The mistake is corrected in the hypothesis given in the appendix to this paper, by
introducing in part C a second sequence of parameter times on path xn(t): (t′nm)
mfn
m=min
such that form = min, . . . , m
f
n, t
′
nm is the time at which them
th change of state affects
switch n and the local state changes from σm−1 to σm. By C8, the spacetime point
xn(t′nm) is required to be in the closure of the causal future of at least m of the points
xn
′
(tn′k′) so that the m
th change of state cannot occur except as an effect of at least
m prior status determinations.
5. Life is like a game of chance.
The indeterministic nature of quantum theory indicates that we are sometimes
confronted with a world in which any one of several possible different futures may
occur. According to the present theory, this happens practically all the time, because
of the stochastic nature of neural processing and the level of detail in which it is
analysed. The different futures referred to here involve different switching structures
and therefore different experiences, rather than the many alternative manifestations
of a single switching structure discussed in the previous section. In a many-minds
interpretation, all such different futures have similar claim to reality. Some possibil-
ities may be more likely than others, but we know from experience that the most
likely does not always happen. We do, however, seem to see a fairly typical world.
Indeed, we can only believe that we have evidence about probability if we believe
the assumption that we do see such a world. Such beliefs do appear to be consis-
tent. Why they should be true is the mystery at the heart of probability, and the
more one thinks about it, the more mysterious it seems to become (Papineau (1995)).
Nevertheless, this mystery can be left unexplained. The goal for physics is to tell us
what the world is like. In this paper, I propose that, for us, the world like a discrete
stochastic process. However mysterious probability may ultimately be, we have no
problem in understanding what it is like to observe such a process. Games of chance
have surrounded us from infancy. Board game players, for example, know what it is
like to wait until two dice show doubles in order to be released from some trap. Poker
players know the rarity of a really good hand. We all know what it means to “know
the odds”.
At the core of this proposal are three essential elements, which indeed are central
to the entire hypothesis. The first is the idea, discussed further in Donald (1997),
that the stochastic process should be discrete, which requires that at any moment
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the future possibilities can be enumerated. It is only because of this discreteness that
the process could be simulated; that it is like a game of chance; that it is the sort of
process with which we are familiar. The second essential element is that the stochastic
process should be well-defined. The probabilities, in other words, are objective. They
are facts which have exact numerical values, and it is the purpose of physical theory to
find the physical laws by which they are defined. In this section, a possible definition
will be put forward. The third essential element is that the stochastic process should
be able to explain our observations. Study of this element will occupy sections 6, 7,
and 8.
According to the present theory, everything which is relevant about the func-
tioning of a brain in its embodiment of a mind can be encoded in a finite switching
structure. In part B of the hypothesis, the immediate successors of a given structure
are defined. In order to define a discrete Markov process, it is only necessary to define
the probabilities for moving from a given structure to its immediate successors. This
will be done in three steps, corresponding to G2, G3 – G7, and G8 of the hypothesis.
In G3 – G7, a definition is given for the a priori probability of a minimal switching
structure S(M,N, [d, ϕ]), and in G8 the jumping probability for moving from a given
structure to a given successor is defined to be proportional to the successor’s a priori
probability. However, before considering these definitions, it is necessary to recall the
mathematical function defined in G2, which lies at the heart of the definition of a
priori probability. Here the relation between that function and the idea of decoher-
ence will be emphasized as this will be fundamental to the analysis of observations in
subsequent sections.
The definition of a priori probability is developed in Donald (1986, 1992, 1995),
where it is based on the introduction of a function appB(σ | ρ) of a set of operators B
and two quantum states (in the sense of definition D3) σ and ρ on B. This function
is interpreted in Donald (1986, 1992), consistent both with an axiomatic definition
and with a broad range of appropriate properties, as giving “the probability, per unit
trial of the information in B, of being able to mistake the state of the world on B
for σ, despite the fact that it is actually ρ”. In other words, appB(σ | ρ) provides a
probability for the observation on B of the appearance of a generalized “collapse”
from local state ρ to local state σ. The collapse is generalized because we are working
at the level of a macroscopic but localized observer whose state will inevitably be
mixed rather than pure. For such an observer, different possibilities will arise as
different approximately-decoherent components of the local mixed state rather than
as eigen-components of a wave-function.
Perhaps the most important property of appB(σ | ρ) is that it generalizes the idea
that the a priori probability of seeing a state σ in a mixture of the form
ρ = pσ + (1− p)σd (5.1)
where σd is disjoint from σ, is the coefficient p of σ. Thus
5.2) Suppose that, on a set B, ρ = pσ+ (1− p)σd for some 0 ≤ p ≤ 1, in other words,
that ρ(B) = pσ(B) + (1− p)σd(B) for all B ∈ B, and suppose that there exists
a projection Q ∈ B such that σ(Q) = 1, σd(Q) = 0.
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Then, in Donald (1992), it is proved, from the definition, that
appB(σ | ρ) = ρ(Q) = p. (5.3)
An approximate form of this result also holds, in the sense that if σ(Q) ∼ 1 and
σd(Q) ∼ 0, then
appB(σ | ρ) ∼ ρ(Q) ∼ p, (5.4)
where the ∼ are given an explicit definition in (5.1) of Donald (1992).
(5.3) equates three different expressions for quantum probability: appB(σ | ρ);
the “expected value” ρ(Q) of the projection Q in the state ρ; and the coefficient p in
(5.2). The “expected value” of an appropriate projection in an appropriate state is
the expression in terms of which empirical results and textbook quantum mechanics
are most easily and most often calculated. However, to use this idea it is necessary to
choose “appropriate” projections and states. It is here that one looks to “the classical
world” or “the macroscopic level” or “the measured operator”; and that, because
none of these concepts can be precisely defined, conventional quantum mechanics
becomes an art rather than a science. The paradox of “Wigner’s friend” exemplifies
the importance of not using “inappropriate” projections. The goal in this paper is to
explain how “appropriate expectations” ρ(Q) can be underpinned by precisely-defined
probabilities.
(5.2) expresses an idea of local “decoherence”. This is one of the most important
themes in the foundations of quantum theory, but it is a theme which is prey to a
well-known confusion. On one hand, there is the idea of adding a classical proba-
bilistic structure to a quantum theory, so that one can speak of the (proper) mixture
pσ + (1− p)σd as being the state σ with probability p and the state σd with proba-
bility 1 − p. On the other hand, there is similar mathematics which can be used to
describe the restrictions of states to localized systems. It is this mathematics which
is often applied through the idea that a pure state is an expression of complete in-
formation about a local system, but that when such a system has interacted with an
environment, complete information is usually not locally available and the local state
can be expressed as an (improper) mixture of decohering possibilities. We deal here
with these improper mixtures. The aim is to express the fundamental probabilistic
structure of quantum theory in terms of the mathematics of (5.2) – (5.4). By relating
improper decoherent mixtures to genuine probabilities of precisely specified events,
the traditional confusion will be explained and the problems of the ambiguity and
inexactness of such mixtures will be solved.
On a technical level, there are several ways in which the idea of decoherence of
quantum states might be expressed. For example,
5.5) With (5.2), we might say that σ is decoherent in ρ on B and that σ and σd are
mutually decoherent in ρ on B. In the circumstances of (5.4), we might say that
σ and σd are approximately mutually decoherent in ρ on B.
5.6) (5.2) implies that, for all B ∈ B such that QB,BQ ∈ B, ρ(QB) = ρ(BQ) =
ρ(Q)σ(B) and we might say that Q is a decohering projection for ρ on B which,
with probability ρ(Q) = p, reduces ρ to σ on B. As long as p = ρ(Q) > 0, (5.2)
also implies that there is an extension ρ′ of ρ such that σ =
Qρ′Q
ρ′(Q)
∣∣∣
B
.
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5.7) The opposite of decoherence is also important. This is the idea that a pure state
is an expression of complete information about a physical system.
The properties of app are such that much of this can be expressed by taking
appB(σ | ρ) to measure (or to define) the probability of σ as a decoherent part of ρ on
B. As far as 5.7 is concerned, the set B defines the localized observables about which
information is available. The coherence of pure states is expressed by the following
property, which holds for any projection P ∈ B:
ρ(P ) = 0 and appB(σ | ρ) > 0⇒ σ(P ) = 0. (5.8)
This implies that if we have total information – if B = B(H) (the set of all observables)
– and if ρ = |Ψ><Ψ| is pure, then appB(H)(σ | ρ) is zero unless σ = |Ψ><Ψ|. This
has a generalization for any C∗-subalgebra C of B(H): if ρ and σ are states on B with
C ⊂ B ⊂ B(H), and if ρ|C (the restriction of ρ to C) is pure, then appB(σ | ρ) is zero
unless σ|C = ρ|C.
Now we turn to the definition for the a priori probability of a minimal switching
structure S(M,N, [d, ϕ]), which was developed in Donald (1992, 1995).
Corresponding to a structure S(M,N, [d, ϕ]), B3 of the hypothesis gives us a set
of ordered switching structures SO(M,N, d′, ϕ′) and for each of these orderings, part
C gives us a set GSO(M,N, d′, ϕ′) of possible geometrical structures W , where each
W is a sequence of the form
W = (x,Λ, θ, (Tn, (tnk)
Kn
k=1, (t
′
nm)
mfn
m=min
, xn(t), Ln(t), Pn, Qn)
N
n=1)
corresponding to the elements defined in part C. Finally, for each geometrical struc-
ture, parts E and F of the hypothesis give us a set N (W ) of sequences (σm)Mm=1 of
restrictions of quantum states to a set of observables B(W ) defined in part D.
The aim now is to use the function appB(σ | ρ) to define the a priori probability
of the sequences (σm)
M
m=1. These are sequences of quantum states, and the move
from σm to σm+1 can be interpreted as the appearance of a generalized collapse in
precisely the sense discussed above. It is then natural to assume that successive
collapses should be treated as independent events and to impose a product structure
on the developing probabilities. There are, however, two problems. One is to know
where to start the sequence, and the other is to know on which set of operators we
have information at any given collapse. The initial quantum state, we shall denote
by ω. This may be thought of as the state corresponding to the “universal wave-
function” of Everett. All a priori probabilities are defined relative to this state. As
we shall see in section 9, it is plausible to think of ω as being an essentially featureless
background, which carries only the texture of the observed universe. Nevertheless,
this texture has to be imposed on all the states in any sequence of collapses. For this
to occur, the mathematics, explained in section 9 of Donald (1992), requires that the
same set of operators be used at each collapse throughout any given sequence.
This leads us to G3 of the hypothesis in which the a priori probability of a
sequence of states (σm)
M
m=1 on a set of operators B given an initial state ω is defined
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by the function appB((σm)
M
m=1 |ω) which satisfies
appB((σm)
M
m=1 |ω) =
M∏
m=1
appB(σm | σm−1) (5.9)
where σ0 = ω.
appB((σm)
M
m=1 |ω) gives us a definition for the a priori probability of individual
sequences of local quantum states. In G4– G6, the a priori probability of a geometrical
structure W is defined inductively by looking for the maximum a priori probability
to which a sequence of elements of N (W ) can approximate, given that the sequences
of initial portions of those elements also approach maximal a priori probability. The
inductive nature of this definition imposes a causal structure according to which the
most likely states for a given determination of switch status are influenced by states
earlier in sequence, but not by later states.
In G7, the a priori probability of a switching structure S(M,N, [d, ϕ]) is de-
fined by taking the supremum over the a priori probabilities of the elements W ∈
GSO(M,N, d′, ϕ′) and over the possible labellings SO(M,N, d′, ϕ′) ∈ S(M,N, [d, ϕ]).
Finally, in G8, the probability of moving from S(M,N, [d, ϕ]) to an immediate
successor S(M ′, N ′, [d′, ϕ′]) is defined to be proportional to the a priori probability
of that successor. The constant of normalization in G8 is significant. For any given
structure S(M,N, [d, ϕ]), there is a finite set of possible immediate successors, denoted
by Ξ(M,N, d, ϕ), and each of the elements of this set has finite a priori probability.
The number
ξ =
∑
{app(S(M ′, N ′, [d′, ϕ′]) |ω) : S(M ′, N ′, [d′, ϕ′]) ∈ Ξ(M,N, d, ϕ)}
is thus finite. ξ is the sum of the a priori probabilities of the possible immediate succes-
sors of S(M,N, [d, ϕ]). If ξ was equal to app(S(M,N, [d, ϕ]) |ω) then S(M,N, [d, ϕ])
could be thought of as splitting into its distinct successors and it would be natural to
define the jumping probability to any one of these successors to be
app(S(M ′, N ′, [d′, ϕ′]) |ω)/app(S(M,N, [d, ϕ]) |ω).
However, the analysis of a priori probability provided in Donald (1992) gives no
reason to believe that ξ should equal app(S(M,N, [d, ϕ]) |ω). If ξ > 1 then the
successors more than exhaust the present and it is reasonable to choose the con-
stant of normalization for the jumping probability to be 1/ξ. On the other hand,
if ξ < 1, I speculate that it is appropriate to normalize the jumping probabilities
by 1/app(S(M,N, [d, ϕ]) |ω) and to introduce a probability of extinction equal to
1− ξ/app(S(M,N, [d, ϕ]) |ω). This is speculation because there can be no direct em-
pirical evidence. The proposed theory considers each individual observer separately,
and no observer can know of, let alone report, his own extinction. Nevertheless, I
do not think that a many-minds theory can be plausible without such an extinction
probability. Indeed, without extinction, “most” switching structures would be very
large and individually very improbable and we might wonder why we should observe
ourselves to be comparatively small and probable.
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6. Observing quantum probabilities.
All the definitions have now been reviewed. The hypothesis defines a stochastic
process on a set of entities. That process could, in principle, be simulated, using
a suitable lattice quantum field theory. Given an initial structure, the probability
of going to any other structure, or of hitting any set of structures, is well defined.
What remains is to establish the connections between this process and our obser-
vations. The complexities of the hypothesis are needed because of the difficulty of
giving a conceptually and mathematically complete formulation of the foundations of
quantum mechanics. But it is also necessary to demonstrate the relationship between
such a complete formulation and the empirical adequacy for all practical purposes of
conventional quantum mechanics.
This is a complicated issue. There should be no doubt that the hypothesis is
conceptually radical. Nothing is “real” except the switching structures of individual
observers (each considered separately), the initial condition ω, the underlying quan-
tum field theory, and the objective probabilities defined by the hypothesis. Out of
these “elements of reality”, each separate observer must construct his experiences and
learn to guess at what his future may bring. This is done by the observer being aware
of his structure as awareness of an “observed world”. How this might be possible is
considered in Donald (1995, 1997). It is a sophisticated form of the doctrine that one
is aware of the external world entirely through being aware of the history of one’s own
brain.
The “observed world”, the world we see about us, is only a mental representa-
tion. In order to understand that representation, we make further representations of
it. Much of our mental processing is involved with such representations of representa-
tions. These representations have their biological explanation in terms of their survival
value; “survival value”, of course, implying enhanced relative probability. Among the
most sophisticated representations available to the modern human observer, are the
theoretical representations of modern physics. These theoretical representations of
his observed world are used by the observer to predict, at least statistically, his future
observations. The purpose in this section is to begin to explain, within the frame-
work of the hypothesis, why these predictions are usually successful. This may seem a
rather limited goal. A more thorough analysis would involve a much more careful and
philosophical discussion of the nature of awareness and of representations, as well as
an investigation of more ordinary aspects of the observed world. However, although
this will not be provided in this paper, it is my belief that what is provided is sufficient
to indicate the essential outlines of such an analysis. Understanding of the quantum
level gives a foundation for conventional ideas about the reduction of the everyday to
that level.
The relationship between the probabilistic predictions of conventional quantum
theory and those of the hypothesis has already been discussed at some length in my
previous papers; particularly in Donald (1992). Much of this discussion remains rele-
vant and is compatible with the improvements presented here. Elementary quantum
theory, quantum statistical mechanics, and decoherence theory produce a picture of
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the local quantum states of a macroscopic system as being, to a good approxima-
tion, decoherent mixtures of correlated states weighted by numbers which reflect the
probabilities defined by elementary quantum theory. The central purpose of the hy-
pothesis is to analyse the information in such an approximate decoherent mixture
of correlations, and to decompose the mixture with probabilities determined by the
weights. Thus, ultimately, the probabilities of elementary quantum mechanics and
the probabilities defined by the hypothesis agree because they all reduce to weights
in quantum mixtures as exemplified by (5.3).
Nevertheless, the introduction of an explicit stochastic process on the space of
switching structures is a significant step which makes plain an incompleteness in
Donald (1992, 1995). Those papers, I believe, provide a correct definition of “a priori
probability” and correctly identify high probability switching structures and the states
to which they are correlated. What was lacking, however, was an adequate theory for
sets of observers, and the suggestion in this direction, made in section 9 of Donald
(1995), now strikes me as insufficient and wrong.
In classical probability theory, if Pr(a) = 2
3
and Pr(b) = 1
3
, then inN independent
trials, a string of N a’s is more likely than any other single string, while for N large,
most members of the set of all possible strings, by simple counting, contain about as
many b’s as a’s. Probability theory applied to sets of strings tells us, however, that,
what we are likely to see, at least for N large, is a “typical” string, which will contain
about N/3 b’s. More precisely, what the mathematics tells us is that for N large,
there is a set of strings, all of which have about N/3 b’s, which has probability close
to one. Similarly in the present theory, what we are likely to see will be determined by
what is “typical”, and to make sense of this, it is not enough just to have a definition
of the most likely observers, nor is it enough merely to be able to count observers.
We also have to have a definition for probabilities of sets of observers. The stochastic
process provides this.
Nevertheless, these objective definitions are only a foundation for probabilistic
reasoning which, in general, will involve both objective probabilities and probabilities
as degrees of rational belief. When we ask how likely it is that we will observe some
outcome for an observation, we need to take into account how much knowledge is
available to us. According to classical physics, outcomes are determined, but we still
say that a fair die will show three with probability 1
6
, because we do not expect to
know the exact initial conditions. The present theory is indeterministic but our igno-
rance often goes beyond that indeterminism. To discover exactly how likely it is that
one should observe some outcome, one would have to know exactly what switching
structure one started from, and define precisely the set of switching structures corre-
sponding to the observation of the particular outcome. As pointed out in section 9
of Donald (1995), neither of these is achievable. Moreover, it is usually not possible
to be precise about the extent of our knowledge. Objective probabilities have to be
precisely definable in order to be objective; if life is like a game of chance, then the
chances must be given in the rules. Rational belief, on the other hand, is by its nature
a vague concept.
20
As a result, there will always be some imprecision in the idea of “typical”, even
beyond the question of what is sufficient for a probability to be “close to one”. But
after all, we can only identify an occurrence as “typical” if it can occur repeatedly and
in a way which is, at least to some extent, unaffected by circumstances. For example,
we can claim that coins will typically land heads about as often as they land tails
without needing to specify which coin is tossed, or when, or by whom, or even the
currency. Similarly, when we discuss the outcomes of observations, we shall refer only
quite vaguely to repeatable physical situations which humans like us might observe.
This imprecision is not important. Although the definitions of the hypothesis must
be exact, exactness is irrelevant when it comes to explaining how those definitions
relate to the insubstantial mental construct which, according to the present theory, is
the everyday world. Here, all that is needed, and all that is possible, are explanations
at a practical level.
In the next three sections, we shall consider the relationship between what is typ-
ical according to the hypothesis and empirical quantum probabilities. Partly because
of the imprecision of the idea of “typical”, and partly because of the complexity of the
theory, it will clearly not be possible to give an explicit analysis from first principles
of the properties of the manifestions of typical switching structures. Instead, we shall
consider aspects of the consistency of the theory and the way in which it supports and
completes the intuitions developed by decoherence theory. On the basis of arguments
already given, it will be assumed that the development of the hypothesis has been
successful and that a valid many-minds interpretation has been achieved. The rela-
tionship between the probabilities defined in the hypothesis and those of conventional
quantum theory will then be examined. The central question in this section is why a
typical modern observer should be aware of a world in which the detailed theoretical
predictions of conventional quantum theory are confirmed. This will be explained
using conventional quantum techniques, without a detailed analysis of single events
at the neural level. Subsequently, we shall consider the probabilistic analysis of indi-
vidual events; first, in section 7, with the study of elementary models; and then, in
section 8, at a more realistic level.
It will be useful to express in precise terms some aspects of the assumptions to
be made:
Definition 6.1 Given an initial state ω and ε > 0, an ε-manifestation of
S(M,N, [d, ϕ]) consists of a manifestation ((σm)
M
m=1,W ) of S(M,N, [d, ϕ]), such that,
for m = 1, . . . ,M ,
| app(N (W ),B(W ), m, ω)− appB(W )((σi)mi=1 |ω)| < ε
and |app(S(M,N, [d, ϕ]) |ω)− app(W |ω)| < ε.
A property which, for all sufficiently small ε > 0, holds for every ε-manifestation of
S(M,N, [d, ϕ]) will be referred to as a necessary property of the physical structure of
S(M,N, [d, ϕ]).
The definitions imply that there are ε-manifestations for any ε > 0.
Assumption 6.2 For S(M,N, [d, ϕ]) corresponding to a typical human observer, it
is a necessary property that its manifestations ((σm)
M
m=1,W ) involve quantum states
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σm which, at least for large m, are quantum states describing an appropriate and
persistent human brain.
Assumption 6.3 In the circumstances of 6.2, it is also necessary that the σm have
high probability extensions which describe the world observed by S(M,N, [d, ϕ]).
Although both assumptions use concepts which need some elucidation, essen-
tially assumption 6.2 says that the hypothesis is sufficient to characterize the physical
structure of human observers, while assumption 6.3 says that the observer’s represen-
tation of the world of appearances is accurate. Both assumptions are fundamental
for a many-minds interpretation, and arguments which can be seen as explaining and
justifying them are to be found throughout this series of papers.
The consistency arguments which use assumption 6.2 will be based on the as-
sumption that our own observations, of ourselves and of our society, give us an accu-
rate picture of a “typical human observer” and of an “appropriate” brain for such an
observer. That brain should be “persistent” in the sense that, for all sufficiently small
ε > 0, if S(M s, Ns, [ds, ϕs]) is a significantly probable successor of S(M,N, [d, ϕ]),
then the brain described by an ε-manifestation of S(M,N, [d, ϕ]) should be suitably
similar to the relevant part of the history of the brain described by the ε-manifestations
of S(M s, Ns, [ds, ϕs]).
In referring to “the world observed by S(M,N, [d, ϕ])” in assumption 6.3, it is
assumed that sufficient structure is contained within S(M,N, [d, ϕ]) for the corre-
sponding observer to be able to construct a mental representation of a world.
Assumption 6.3 also refers to the idea of a high probability extension of a state
σm. This was discussed at length in Donald (1992). For an example, suppose that the
structure S(M,N, [d, ϕ]) corresponds to a particular person who is watching a football
match. According to 6.2, manifestations ((σm)
M
m=1,W ) exist for which the sequences
of states (σm)
M
m=1 give an accurate description of the spectator’s brain. Information
about the present position of the ball will be contained both in S(M,N, [d, ϕ]) and in
(σm)
M
m=1. This means that, if the theory is consistent, then there should be probable
extensions ρ′ of σM (the present moment state of the observer’s brain) to sets of
observables B which are contained in some local algebra A(Λ), where Λ contains the
observed ball position, such that ρ′ restricted to B is a possible quantum state for a
football. ρ′ will depend on the initial state ω in the same way that, in conventional
physics, our personal observations will not be sufficient to determine the exact current
state of a football and for the remaining information we could look to the initial
conditions for the universe. The following definition provides one way of defining
suitable states ρ′:
Definition 6.4 Given a switching structure S(M,N, [d, ϕ]), a set of operators B, an
initial state ω, ε > 0, and an ε-manifestation ((σm)
M
m=1,W ) of S(M,N, [d, ϕ]) define
a state ρ′ on B to be an ε-prediction for S(M,N, [d, ϕ]) of the current state on B, if
ρ′ = σ′M |B for some state σ′M such that there exists a sequence (σ′m)Mm=1 with σ′0 = ω,
and σ′m|B(W ) = σm|B(W ) with
appB1((σ
′
m)
M
m=1 |ω) ≥ sup{appB1((σ′′m)Mm=1 |ω) : σ′′0 = ω, σ′′m|B(W ) = σm|B(W )} − ε
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where B1 = B(W ) ∪ {BC : B ∈ B, C ∈ C(W )}. (B1 is the minimal set containing
B and B(W ) which also allows correlations between B and the switch projections
experienced by the observer to be expressed (§3 of Donald (1992).)
A property which, for all sufficiently small ε > 0, holds for every ε-prediction will
be referred to as a property predicted by S(M,N, [d, ϕ]) of the state on B.
Although this is a reasonable definition, it is not unmodifiable. Indeed, an alter-
native definition could be based on postulate eight of Donald (1992). However, the
idea of a high probability extension is not a fundamental concept within the theory,
and so does not need to be absolutely and unambiguously defined. B and Λ in the
example are clearly fuzzy, and, in general, there need not be a unique limiting state
ρ′ for ε→ 0. Nevertheless, if the present theory has any validity, then, in appropriate
circumstances, both suitable sequences (σm)
M
m=1 and suitable extensions ρ
′ of σM will
exist “for all practical purposes”. This will be sufficient as a basis for an explanation
of ordinary observation in the framework of the full theory which will in turn make
the theory plausible.
Ultimately, extensions as defined by 6.4, or in any other way, are merely means
of expressing the fundamental “elements of reality” referred to at the start of this
section. Such extensions are the best possible theoretical representations of the world
seen by the observer; that is, of the world of which, through his switching structure,
the observer has created a mental representation. Our ordinary physical knowledge
has been developed to make predictions about the world we observe. We can use that
knowledge, both to choose appropriate extensions, given partial information about an
observer’s structure; and, given an extension, to make predictions about the observer’s
subsequent structure. Because we understand our own switching structures through
the representations of external worlds that we construct from them, the easiest way
for us to predict the likely temporal development of any switching structure is, first to
construct a theoretical representation of the corresponding observed world – in other
words, an extension – and then use that extension to predict future observations.
Although this is the easiest way, it is not the fundamental way, which is, of course,
that defined by the hypothesis.
Agreement between the two ways will be a consequence of properties of the a
priori probability function and of the fundamental quantum dynamics. In the most
likely extended states, the information in a switching structure is correlated with
observables external to the observer. The a priori probability function requires the
quantum states of the observer to change as slowly as is possible, given the information
available. No change in quantum state, in the Heisenberg picture used throughout
this work, would correspond to evolution of observables under Hamiltonian dynamics.
Our knowledge of conventional quantum theory allows us to model that evolution on
either internal or external observables, and we can then use the correlations to relate
one set to the other. Changes in information also can be correlated between internal
and external observables.
Statistical mechanics is one field in which it is particularly valuable to be able to
claim that a definition like 6.4 provides the best possible theoretical representation of
the state of the observed world. For suitable sets B, ρ′ will be the predicted state of
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an observed thermal system. Such states certainly need not be pure. A fairly exactly
specified non-zero (von Neumann) entropy may well be a predicted property, in the
sense of 6.4, for a thermal system. The observer may only have information about
macroscopic parameters, and the states predicted by 6.4 will then be something like
the maximum entropy state given fixed values of those parameters. This means that
in the present framework, it is not necessary to rely on ergodic theory in order to
explain why, in suitable circumstances, statistical mechanical systems behave as if
they occupied Gibbs equilibrium states. In a sense made precise by definition 6.4, the
observed state is an “ensemble”.
One of the major difficulties in the analysis of quantum probability is the variety
of different notions of “probability” which are involved. A distinction between an
ontological idea of probability as objective and an epistemological idea of probability
as degree of rational belief has already been drawn. It is now useful to make two
further distinctions, between public and private and theoretical and empirical prob-
abilities. First is the theoretical concept of public (observer independent) quantum
probability. Depending on the circumstances, this may be calculated using the ex-
pected value of a projection, or the square of a transition amplitude, or the coefficient
of a component of the expansion of a density matrix into disjoint pure states, or an
a priori probability defined by the function app of (5.9). Sometimes, as in equation
(5.3), different calculations will give the same answer. The corresponding empirical
notion can be expressed by, for example, the published long-term relative frequencies
of particular types of observational results. A second theoretical notion is expressed
by the probabilities defined by the stochastic process of the hypothesis. These are
private in the sense that they apply to an individual observer. The corresponding rel-
ative frequencies will be experienced in the awareness of that observer. According to
the present theory, public probabilities are only shadows of the fundamental private
probabilities.
Relations between the public notion of quantum probability and the private no-
tion are subtle and give rise to two closely-related theses:
Thesis 6.5 A typical modern human observer should be aware of a world in which
quantum theory is accepted and in which its detailed theoretical predictions are con-
firmed.
Thesis 6.6 Under apppropriate circumstances, there is a fairly direct agreement
between the private and public probabilities.
It is a consequence of thesis 6.5 that the present theory is an interpretation of
quantum theory. In section 8, a model of the functioning of a human brain which is
consistent with thesis 6.6 will be expounded. In the remainder of the present section,
the relation between the theses will be examined, and it will be argued that 6.5
would hold even under conditions much weaker than 6.6. 6.6 involves the study of
precisely-specified individual experiences, but for 6.5, it is sufficient to consider only
broadly-characterized events with nearly-certain “typical” outcomes.
The model of brain functioning in section 8 separates quantum probabilities
from the counting of neural events and geometries and shows that agreement between
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private and public probabilities follows from appropriate assumptions of indifference
in the counting between possible alternative observations. The possibility of 6.6 failing
while 6.5 succeeded might arise if these indifference assumptions failed to hold for some
particular class of personal experience. For example, a significant difference between
the hypothesis of this paper and the version of Donald (1995) is that in the earlier
version, the determinations of switch status were required, in the language of part
F, to alternate between “open” and “closed”. Under this assumption, the number of
structures corresponding to a high level of neural activity was raised relative to the
number corresponding to a low level. This would breach the indifference assumption
when an observer was presented with a pair of alternatives which would give rise
to significantly different levels of activity. As an example, one might consider an
observer listening to the sound of a Geiger counter and presume that more neural
activity would follow clicking than silence.
Because the fundamental probabilities are private, ultimately the only empirical
tests of either 6.5 or 6.6 consist of asking yourself whether it is in accord with your
own personal observations. As far as 6.5 is concerned, we do (do we not?) experience
a world in which it appears that satisfactory tests of the public notion of quantum
probability abound, and, that so far, when “appropriate” calculations have been used,
those tests have been passed. This means that we do have tests of 6.5. Indeed, an
explanation of why the present theory predicts that typical observers will experience
a world in which the details of quantum theory are publicly confirmed will allow the
present theory to annex all the public empirical evidence for those details.
As far as 6.6 is concerned, suppose once again that it failed, and that the proba-
bility of some possible observation which involved a high level of neural activity was
raised relative to an alternative involving a low level. This would lead to a situation
in which a typical observer would tend to find himself seeing more of the high ac-
tivity alternative than he would expect; either from quantum mechanical calculation,
or from reports from other laboratories. Thus, with the Geiger counter example, he
might find that his personal measurements, with enhanced probability of clicking,
corresponded to radioactive lifetimes that were shorter than expected. If he per-
formed his experiments in the company of a colleague, then, because of the most
basic quantum correlations, he would see her seeing the same results, and thus he
would find her agreeing with him about the puzzling discrepancy; but if he asked
her to repeat the experiments in his absence, then he would be most likely to see
her reporting to him that the discrepancy had disappeared. In such a case, each
individual separately would typically believe that his own personal observations were
somewhat unusual. The performance of quantum experiments in public would even
allow a public consensus about these anomalies, at least among the audience for the
experiments.
Turning now to sufficient conditions for 6.5, recall that in classical theory, if
we are given a source of strings and we have reason to believe that the letters are
produced independently and with constant probabilities, then we can estimate those
probabilities by assuming that the string we happen to have been given is typical – or
more precisely that the letters in it have typical relative frequencies. The laws of large
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numbers tell us that this is a consistent procedure and that the longer our test string,
the better our estimates will be likely to be. Similarly, in quantum theory, we can use
the assumption that suitable observations have been typical to estimate the probabil-
ities of simple repeated individual events. The present theory will be consistent as an
interpretation of quantum theory only if those estimates are likely to agree with the
theoretical predictions of elementary quantum theory. Moreover, the classical laws
of large numbers explain how the empirical basis for probabilistic reasoning can be
reduced to the observation of properties with sharply peaked distributions, and the
aim here is to show how the same reduction can be made in quantum theory.
Experimental tests of probabilistic theories always depend on the laws of large
numbers to produce significant and near certain answers from noisy and uninteresting
random data. This is particularly important in the present theory, because, in situa-
tions in which the noisy and uninteresting random data is not directly observed, only
the significant answers affect the switching structures and the set of manifestations
of the observer. Then, because of the near certainty of those answers, the details of
the definition of private probabilities are irrelevant.
In order to be aware of a world in which quantum theory is accepted, it is not
necessary to be aware of the detailed history by which the experimental evidence for
quantum theory has been built up. It is only necessary to be aware of a limited
range of almost inevitable facts about the world, involving the sort of summaries of
experimental evidence which we could expect to learn at second-hand, either from
colleagues, or from machines, or even from textbooks. For example, these facts might
include the relation between the observed spectrum of hydrogen and the calculated
eigenvalues of the corresponding Schro¨dinger equation. In conventional terms, any
account of the observation of a hydrogen spectrum would ultimately depend on the
existence of many individual atomic excitations, but in the present theory, even direct
observation of the spectral lines no more provides evidence for specific excitations,
than observation of a double slit interference pattern provides evidence for the passage
of electrons through specific slits.
When we look at an interference pattern formed by an appropriately prepared
stream of electrons hitting a screen, we can almost certainly expect to see a pattern
which will show the wave-like behaviour of the electron and which may be used to
confirm the de Broglie relation between electron energy and wave-length. We will not
however see any evidence of the order in which individual electrons have struck the
screen. And because, according to the present theory, only the observations of an indi-
vidual observer are authentic, with each individual considered separately; this means
that, in this situation, there is no actual order in which individual electrons struck
the screen. The present theory has built in to it a natural “coarse graining” which
means that no definite existence is required beyond the direct personal experience of
individual observers.
An observation may have both typical and specific aspects. In many circum-
stances, it is permissible to focus on the typical aspects, because the classical proba-
bilistic structure defined by the hypothesis allows us simply to aggregate the specific
aspects. For example, when we look at a complicated bubble chamber photograph,
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we do observe specific quantum events of low a priori probability. The corpuscular
behaviour that is revealed, however, will be typical of all such photographs. When
we have looked at the photograph, we will have seen something which, in its precise
details, was of low probability. Because those details will have affected our internal
structure, this probability is “private”, and its analysis will depend on the validity of
thesis 6.6. Nevertheless, we will be part of a large set of observers, who in looking
at the photograph, both see evidence for particulate structure and share a common
history up to the moment of starting to examine the photograph. As a future of the
common history, that set will have had high probability.
Among all our predictable information about quantum theory, there is much in-
formation about the values of quantum probabilities. Indeed, as observers of quantum
probabilities, we are, more often than not, in the position of the gambler’s wife who
sees only the nightly remorse, and not the card-by-card ups and downs.
example 6.7 Let strings s = (sn)
N
n=1 of a’s and b’s be generated by N independent
and identically distributed classical trials, with Pr(sn = a) = p, Pr(sn = b) = 1− p.
The laws of large numbers tell us that the set of all strings with approximately pN
a’s has probability close to one.
For example, for δ > 0 and η > 12 , let X
N
δ,η be the set of strings with between
pN − δNη and pN + δNη a’s. Then, applying Chebyshev’s inequality to the random
variable which gives the relative frequency of a in s, gives
Pr(XNδ,η) ≥ 1− δ−2p(1− p)N1−2η
and so Pr(XNδ,η)→ 1 as N →∞.
Suppose that ρ is a density matrix on a Hilbert space H, that P is a projection,
and that ρ(P ) = p. Let (Hn, ρn, Pn)Nn=1 be a sequence of N isomorphic copies of
(H, ρ, P ). Set Qn = 1− Pn. Let HN = ⊗Nn=1Hn and ρN = ⊗Nn=1ρn.
ρN provides a quantum model of the classical distribution with sn = a corre-
sponding to Pn and sn = b corresponding to Qn, in the sense that the expected value
in the state ρN of any projection of the form ⊗Nn=1Rn where Rn is either Pn or Qn
is the same as the probability of the corresponding string. Sums of these projections
have expected values which are the same as the probabilities of the corresponding sets
of strings. For example, there is a projection PXN
δ,η
on HN corresponding to the set
XNδ,η and ρ
N (PXN
δ,η
)→ 1 as N →∞.
The relative frequency operator FN is defined by
FN =
N∑
M=0
M
N
PSN
M
where PSN
M
is the projection corresponding to the set SNM of strings of length N with
exactly M a’s. Direct calculations, or standard results on the binomial distribution,
yield ρN (FN ) = p and ρN ((FN −p)2) = p(1−p)/N (cf. Hartle (1968) and the papers
by DeWitt and by Graham in DeWitt and Graham (1973)).
For an application of this example, suppose that an observer becomes aware that
many independent repetitions of an appropriate experiment on identically prepared
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systems have been performed. If he has sufficient information about the systems
used, then this awareness would mean that the existence of the experiments would
be a prediction of the observer in the sense of 6.4. Thus, at the beginning of the
experiment, it would be possible to construct sets Bn which could be modelled by
B(Hn), such that the state predicted by the switching structure of the observer on
⊗Nn=1Bn would be a product state which could be modelled by ρN .
The observer can now use example 6.7 to predict that, as far as public quantum
probabilities are concerned, the most likely observed proportion of experiments with
result a will be p. More precisely, at the time that the experiment is set up, the
observer can predict, in the sense of 6.4, that expectations of the observables modelling
PXN
δ,η
, or FN , or (FN −p)2 will be as given by example 6.7, and, through the analysis
of appropriate collapse-free quantum dynamics, he can extend such expectations to
observables modelling public records of the proportion of experiments with result a.
Suppose that subsequently the observer is told in roughly what proportion of the
experiments result a was observed, but that he does not observe the individual results.
Then his own personal quantum states will become directly correlated to a limited
range of values for FN . In theory, to make a complete model of this situation, one
would start from manifestations of a particular switching structure S(M,N, [d, ϕ]).
One would then construct its successors and predict properties of the manifestations
of those successors. One might do this, for example, by an explicit dynamical model
of a von Neumann-type measurement of FN , or, perhaps, just by considering chains
of correlation from sums of eigen-projections of FN (like PXN
δ,η
), to possible records
of the relative frequency, and thence to possible neural observations of those records.
A “collapse” process is necessarily involved in this situation, as it is not inevitable
that the observed relative frequency will be close to p. However, the point of example
6.7 is that far more weight in ρN is attached to such relative frequencies. If the ob-
server did observe all the individual results, then thesis 6.6 would be relevant because
there would be the possibility of a systematic bias in the individual observations.
However, as long as he is only aware of, or influenced by, the overall proportion of
different results and particularly if he is just making a simple choice between whether
the relative frequency is close to p or not, the large relative difference of weights in
ρN will continue to dominate in the probabilistic analysis.
In fact, as will be discussed in section 8, the nature of the human brain, and the
way that it is modelled by the hypothesis, mean that S(M,N, [d, ϕ]) will have a huge
number of relevant successors, differing in a myriad of fine details of neural processing.
Nevertheless, because they are not correlated to individual results, those fine details
will not systematically affect the observed proportion of a results, and correlation
to sums of eigen-projections of FN will ensure that, in all but a probabilistically
negligible set of successors, the proportion will be close to p. This implies that, in
this situation, the proportion observed by the “typical” observer will agree with the
proportion predicted by elementary quantum theory.
Example 6.7 indicates how the hypothesis can provide a framework in which the
large N mathematics of the quantum laws of large numbers can be applied without
either having to pass to the limit N =∞ or having to use the multitude of individual
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systems as our conceptual basis. It is not necessary to pass to the limit N = ∞
to derive classical probabilities from example 6.7, because the hypothesis defines ob-
jective classical probabilities for individual finite observers. On the other hand, the
elementary projections ⊗Nn=1Rn need not be considered as being more fundamental
than composite projections like PXN
δ,η
. It is the individual observer who is fundamen-
tal and whose structure provides the natural coarse-graining. Given this, it becomes
possible to generalize the analysis of example 6.7 to a wide variety of circumstances
in which records of predictable quantum probabilities are observed. It also becomes
possible to apply many other schemes in which large N mathematics has been used to
reveal quasi-classical structures (e.g. Hepp (1972), Namiki et al. (1997)), and to ad-
dress the conceptual issues which have made those schemes problematic (Bell (1975),
Giulini et al. (1996, §9.1 – 9.3)).
In this section, it has been argued that the hypothesis is compatible with em-
pirical evidence for quantum theory. This means that that evidence can be used in
turn as an important part of the justification for the hypothesis. This is a consistency
argument which starts with the development of the hypothesis as a way of making
sense of the empirical evidence. Then it is supposed that the hypothesis does describe
quantum states which are states of a brain processing definite information, and that
those states can be extended to describe systems external to the brain. Finally, by
considering the properties that such systems could be expected to have, and how those
properties will evolve and correlate with possible future states of the observer, it is
argued that a typical observer will be aware of empirical evidence for quantum the-
ory. The consequence of this is that the overall picture is consistent. Such consistency
between observation and theory is what it means to have an interpretation.
What remains is to consider whether the details of the hypothesis provide a plau-
sible theory of individual observations of individual events with uncertain outcomes.
7. Elementary Models.
There are many interwoven aspects to the hypothesis. In this section, I shall
attempt to explain some of these aspects by showing how the hypothesis develops
from Everett’s original picture. The consistent histories theory will also be briefly
discussed, and analogies will be drawn to the present theory.
Following Everett, most elementary versions of the many-minds interpretation
assume that, if we wish to describe the observation of a quantum experiment, then
we can split the Hilbert space H of the universe naturally into a tensor product
H = HO ⊗ Hex where HO is a space of wave-functions for the observer and Hex is
a space of wave-functions for his experimental apparatus and for the world external
to him. Then, it is assumed that the true state of the universe (ω) is a pure state,
ω = |Ψ><Ψ| and that Ψ has a decomposition of the form
Ψ =
∞∑
r=0
√
prψr ⊗ ϕr (7.1)
where (ϕr)
∞
r=0 is an orthonormal set of wave-functions representing the distinct re-
sults of the experiment and the rest of the universe, while (ψr)
∞
r=0 is a sequence of
29
wave-functions for the observer, with ψr representing the observer observing the re-
sult represented by ϕr. (7.1) then models correlations between wave-functions of the
observer and wave-functions of the rest of the universe by proposing that ψr is cor-
related with ϕr, and models the probabilities of different observations by proposing
that observation r has probability pr.
In my earlier papers, I have argued that almost every aspect of this model is an
over-simplification. Nevertheless, equation (7.1) does introduce the intuition which
powers the many-minds interpretation. The hypothesis in the appendix to this pa-
per is no more than an attempt to solve the problems of (7.1) while preserving the
intuition.
Even within the framework of (7.1), one important forward step in the analysis of
ω is possible. As observers we undoubtedly interact only with very limited aspects of
the entire universe. Because of this, we need only consider restrictions of ω to sets of
observables B(t) accessible to the observer at time t. Appeal to the existence of such
sets allows us to assume that ω is a mixture of macroscopically different “observer
states”. Such an assumption will not be correct at the global level of the “wave-
function of the universe”, but, as we are assured by decoherence theory (Giulini et
al. (1996)), it is almost surely true for appropriate local restrictions of such a wave-
function. Let us therefore denote by B(t) some suitable choice of local observables.
Working in the Heisenberg picture, the time dependence of the splitting of ω can
then be expressed in the time dependence of ω|B(t). Part D of the hypothesis defines
a sophisticated version of B(t), but, even in the framework of (7.1), we can take
B(t) = B(HO) ⊗ 1, where B(HO) is the set of all bounded operators on the Hilbert
space HO. This choice allows us to replace (7.1) by
|Ψ><Ψ|∣∣
B(HO)⊗1
=
∞∑
r=0
pr|ψr><ψr|. (7.2)
In (7.2), only the observer states are considered and correlations with the ob-
served system are lost. This is also true in the hypothesis. With the full hypothesis
applied at the human level, the idea, as discussed in the previous section, is that the
external observed system can be “reconstructed” from the internal structure of the
observer – in other words, we “observe” (exist as) not the “real world”, but (as) that
apparent shadow of the apparently real world formed by the functioning of our brains.
However it is also useful to note that, to a good approximation, correlations with the
observed system can be restored in (7.2) by appropriate enlargements of the set of
operators considered. For example, according to various models of environmental de-
coherence, it would be not be unreasonable to write Hex = Hsys ⊗Henv, where Hsys
represents wave-functions of the system under observation and Henv represents the
rest of the universe including the environment of that system, and to replace (7.1) by
Ψ =
∞∑
r=0
√
prψr ⊗ ϕr ⊗ χr (7.3)
where (ϕr)
∞
r=0 (resp. (χr)
∞
r=0) is an orthonormal set in Hsys (resp. Henv) (cf. (3.15)
of Giulini et al. (1996)). We can now take
B(t) = B(HO)⊗ B(Hsys)⊗ 1 = B(HO ⊗Hsys)⊗ 1,
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where B(Hsys) is the set of all bounded operators on the Hilbert space Hs and this
allows us to replace (7.2) by
|Ψ><Ψ|∣∣
B(HO⊗Hsys)⊗1
=
∞∑
r=0
pr|ψr><ψr| ⊗ |ϕr><ϕr|. (7.4)
In (7.4), the correlations between wave-functions ψr and ϕr continue to be ex-
pressed. Nevertheless, (7.4) is only an approximation, and there is considerable am-
biguity in the choice of the space Hsys. Similar ambiguities will arise in any analysis
of correlation at the level of the full theory (e.g. in definition 6.4).
The language of (5.6) applies in this scenario: |ψr><ψr| ⊗ 1 ⊗ 1 (respectively
1⊗ |ϕr><ϕr| ⊗ 1, |ψr><ψr| ⊗ |ϕr><ϕr| ⊗ 1) is a decohering projection for |Ψ><Ψ|
on B(HO) ⊗ 1 ⊗ 1 (resp. 1 ⊗ B(Hsys) ⊗ 1, B(HO ⊗ Hsys) ⊗ 1, reducing |Ψ><Ψ| to
|ψr><ψr| (resp. |ϕr><ϕr|, |ψr><ψr| ⊗ |ϕr><ϕr|) with, in all cases, probability pr.
The most fundamental problem with (7.1) – (7.4) lies in the identification of
“wave-functions for the observer” and in the indexing of such wave-functions. My
proposed solution to this problem is part A of the hypothesis and the idea of switching
structures. Using this idea, suggests a generalization of (7.2) of the form
ω
∣∣
B(t)
= p0ρ
∣∣
B(t)
+
R∑
r=1
prσO[r]
∣∣
B(t)
(7.5)
where 0 ≤ pr ≤ 1 for r = 0, 1, . . . , R,
∑R
r=0 pr = 1, ρ is an arbitrary quantum state
disjoint from the σO[r], {O[1], . . . , O[R]} is a set of possible observers, and σO[r] is
a quantum state of the universe in which the physical structure of the observer in
question is a manifestation of O[r]. Parts C, E, and F of the hypothesis are concerned
with the mapping from switching structures O[r] to possible states σO[r].
Assuming that the σO[r] are disjoint in the sense that there exist projections
Q[r] ∈ B(t) such that σO[r](Q[s]) = δrs and ρ(Q[s]) = 0, (7.5) and (5.3) yield
appB(t)(σO[r] |ω) = ω(Q[r]) = pr. (7.6)
This “a priori probability” agrees with the standard probabilistic interpretation of
quantum mixtures applied to equation (7.5).
The next stage in the elaboration of the hypothesis is to consider with more care
the time development of an observer. This suggests a modification of (7.5) to read
σO[rm]
∣∣
B(m+1)
= p[rm, 0]ρrm,0
∣∣
B(m+1)
+
Rm+1∑
rm+1=1
p[rm, rm+1]σO[rm,rm+1]
∣∣
B(m+1)
. (7.7)
In (7.7), t has been replaced by a discrete marker m for the steps of a developing
process and the state of a structure at step m is split into states for its possible
immediate successors at step m+ 1. (7.6) becomes
appB(m+1)(σO[rm,rm+1] | σO[rm]) = σO[rm](Q[rm+1]) = p[rm, rm+1]. (7.8)
For notational convenience, (7.7) will be rewritten as
σO[rm]
∣∣
B(m+1)
=
Rm+1∑
rm+1=0
p[rm, rm+1]σO[rm,rm+1]
∣∣
B(m+1)
. (7.9)
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In (7.9), the “left-over” state ρrm,0 has been absorbed into the main sum by setting
σO[rm,0] = ρrm,0. Similar remainders will occur frequently below.
When (7.1) or (7.2) is presented in elementary versions of many-minds or many-
worlds interpretations, something closer to (7.9) is often being invoked, because usu-
ally the assumption is made that there is a quantum measurement being considered
and that the apparatus for that measurement already exists. These assumptions are
false in a universal quantum theory without collapse. In such a theory, the universal
uncollapsed quantum state ω superposes all possible situations that might occur on
planets like ours by this stage in the development of the universe.
(7.7), (7.8), and (7.9) model only one time step but generalize immediately to
a succession of steps. Thus, set σO[ ] = ω and, for m = 0, 1, . . . ,M − 1, consider a
sequence of equations analogous to (7.9):
σO[r1,...,rm−1,rm]
∣∣
B(m+1)
=
Rm+1∑
rm+1=0
p[r1, . . . , rm−1, rm, rm+1] σO[r1,...,rm−1,rm,rm+1]
∣∣
B(m+1)
, (7.10)
where there exist projections Q[r1, . . . , rm−1, rm, rm+1] ∈ B(m+ 1) such that
σO[r1,...,rm−1,rm,rm+1](Q[r
1, . . . , rm−1, rm, sm+1]) = δrm+1sm+1 . (7.11)
(7.10) and (7.11) model a single event in which an observer O[r1, . . . , rm−1, rm],
defined by his entire history, has the possibility of jumping to one of a set of possible
futures
{O[r1, . . . , rm−1, rm, rm+1] : rm+1 = 0, . . . , Rm+1}
with corresponding probabilities p[r1, . . . , rm−1, rm, rm+1]. The possibility rm+1 = 0
corresponds to extinction.
(7.10) is identical to (7.9) except that the history of each observer has been made
explicit in the notation. The next proposal however is not merely notational. Suppose
that, for m = 0, 1, . . . ,M − 1,
σO[r1,...,rm−1,rm]
∣∣
B(M)
=
Rm+1∑
rm+1=0
p[r1, . . . , rm−1, rm, rm+1] σO[r1,...,rm−1,rm,rm+1]
∣∣
B(M)
(7.12)
where there exist projections Q[r1, . . . , rm−1, rm, rm+1] ∈ B(M) such that
σO[r1,...,rm−1,rm,rm+1](Q[r
1, . . . , rm−1, rm, sm+1]) = δrm+1sm+1 . (7.13)
In (7.12) and (7.13), the set of observables B(m+1) has been replaced by the set
B(M). This is an important change, which, in a related form, is discussed at length
in Donald (1992). All states in the sequence have to be localized to the same set of
observables, if the full influence of earlier states on later states is to be expressed.
Whether or not is it justifiable to assume that the states σO[r1,...,rm−1,rm,rm+1] are
decoherent both on B(m+1) and on B(M) depends on the precise definition of these
sets and is the reason why the set B(W ) of D2 of the hypothesis is not taken to be a
von Neumann algebra.
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In the elementary version of the many-minds interpretation, the extension from
single to multiple observations is made by a replacement of (7.3) by
Ψ =
∞∑
r1=0
∞∑
r2=0
. . .
∞∑
rM=0
√
p[r1]p[r2] . . . p[rM ]
ψ[r1,r2,...,rM ] ⊗ ϕr1 ⊗ ϕr2 ⊗ . . .⊗ ϕrM ⊗ χ[r1,r2,...,rM ], (7.14)
where now separate independent Hilbert spaces Hsys1 , Hsys2 , . . . , HsysM have been
introduced for each successive observation. (7.14) is essentially the decomposition of Ψ
proposed by Everett in his treatment of “memory sequences”, together with an added
result-dependent environmental decoherence term χ[r1,r2,...,rM ]. This additional term
means that (7.4) can be replaced by
|Ψ><Ψ|∣∣
B(HO⊗Hsys1⊗...⊗HsysM )⊗1
=
∞∑
r1=0
∞∑
r2=0
. . .
∞∑
rM=0
p[r1]p[r2] . . . p[rM ]
|ψ[r1,r2,...,rM ]><ψ[r1,r2,...,rM ]| ⊗ |ϕr1><ϕr1 | ⊗ |ϕr2><ϕr2 | ⊗ . . .⊗ |ϕrM><ϕrM |.
(7.15)
Conceptually, (7.15) is very different from the sequence (7.12). (7.15) relies on a
set of observables (B(HO)) localized to the present time with which the observer can
describe his current memories of the past, while in the extension from (7.10) to (7.12)
in the theory of this paper, it is assumed that B(1) ⊂ B(2) ⊂ . . . ⊂ B(M) and that
B(m) is a set of observables which is localized in the past of the observer (cf. part
D of the hypothesis). In many-minds quantum theory, nothing is definite unless it is
part of the structure of an observer. Thus, in a theory based on (7.15), an observer’s
past is not definite, except in as far as it can be reconstructed from his present time
structure. This is one source of the problem, referred to in sections 3 and 4, of identity
over time. The culmination of the instant-to-instant approach suggested by (7.15) is
the idea (Barbour (1994)) that existence in time is an illusion – that an observer
exists only momentarily and that “the past” is only a representation of instantaneous
physical “memory traces”. This idea is rejected in the hypothesis, according to which
the past of an observer is part of his structure. I have underpinned this proposal by
arguing (in Donald (1997)) that the analysis of the relationship between mind and
brain can, at the very least, be considerably simplified if we take our awareness to be
constructed from our past as well as from our present.
As a model for the hypothesis, (7.12) is only a model at the level of the individual
manifestations described in section 4. For this to be successful when applied to
a switching structure S(M,N, [d, ϕ]) modelled by O[r1, . . . , rM−1, rM ], we need to
invoke assumptions 6.2 and 6.3, and assume that, for some sufficiently small ε >
0, there is an ε-manifestation ((σm)
M
m=1,W ) of S(M,N, [d, ϕ]) such that, for m =
1, . . . ,M , σm is given by σO[r1,...,rm−1,rm], and B(W ) by B(M).
If this is possible, then, from definition 6.1,
|app(S(M,N, [d, ϕ]) |ω)− appB(W )((σm)Mm=1 |ω)| ≤ 2ε. (7.16)
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If we now assume that we can take ε = 0, then (7.12), (7.13), (5.3), and (5.9) yield
app(S(M,N, [d, ϕ]) |ω) = appB(W )((σm)Mm=1 |ω) = appB(M)((σO[r1,...,rm−1,rm])Mm=1 |ω)
= p[r1, . . . , rM−1, rM ]p[r1, . . . , rM−1] . . . p[r1]. (7.17)
When we extend this model to the immediate successors of S(M,N, [d, ϕ]), we
will model those successors by
{O[r1, . . . , rM−1, rM , rM+1] : rM+1 = 1, . . . , RM+1}
and we will replace (7.12) and (7.13) with
σO[r1,...,rm]
∣∣
B(M+1)
=
Rm+1∑
rm+1=0
p[r1, . . . , rm, rm+1] σO[r1,...,rm,rm+1]
∣∣
B(M+1)
(7.18)
where there exist projections Q[r1, . . . , rm−1, rm, rm+1] ∈ B(M + 1) such that
σO[r1,...,rm−1,rm,rm+1](Q[r
1, . . . , rm−1, rm, sm+1]) = δrm+1sm+1 . (7.19)
for m = 0, 1, . . . ,M .
Using these equations, and assuming that we can continue to set ε = 0 in expres-
sions analogous to (7.16), the normalization constant ξ of G8 can, by the same steps
that led to (7.17), be calculated to be
ξ =
RM+1∑
rM+1=1
p[r1, . . . , rM , rM+1]p[r1, . . . , rM ] . . . p[r1]
=
RM+1∑
rM+1=1
p[r1, . . . , rM , rM+1]app(S(M,N, [d, ϕ]) |ω)
= (1− p[r1, . . . , rM , 0])app(S(M,N, [d, ϕ]) |ω).
This implies that ξ ≤ app(S(M,N, [d, ϕ]) |ω) and it follows that the probability of
moving to successor O[r1, . . . , rM−1, rM , rM+1], as given by G8, will be
p[r1, . . . , rM , rM+1], and the probability of extinction will be p[r1, . . . , rM , 0]. These
probabilities agree with those given in connection with (7.10).
This long chain of suppositions shows that the hypothesis is a development of
elementary models like (7.12) and (7.18), and that the probabilities it produces stem
from such elementary models. However, although it may be a useful starting point,
revealing some of the points at issue and linking directly to other interpretations, in
fact, (7.12) is not a particularly accurate model of the way in which the hypothesis
represents the changing quantum states of a human brain. There are two problems
with the suggested type of map O[r1, . . . , rm−1, rm] → σO[r1,...,rm−1,rm] from the set
of observers into a set of quantum states. One problem, which will be discussed in
the next section, is that although such a map can be part of a good model of the
hypothesis, the map concerned may be effectively many-to-one rather than one-to-
one. The second, and even more fundamental important problem, is that no explicit
definition of any such map has been suggested, and, in fact, there does not seem to be
any precise choice of state corresponding to a given observer. This problem is solved
in the hypothesis essentially by calculating probabilities through a supremum over
the entire set of possible observer manifestations.
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(7.12) and (7.13) model a theory in which a finite number (M) of events occur,
and at event m there are Rm+1 possible distinguishable outcomes with probabilities
which depend on the previous outcomes. Combining the whole sequence gives
ω
∣∣
B(M)
=
RM∑
rM=0
RM−1∑
rM−1=0
. . .
R1∑
r1=0
p[r1, . . . , rM−1, rM ]p[r1, . . . , rM−1]
. . . p[r1]σO[r1,...,rM−1,rM ]
∣∣
B(M)
(7.20)
and, extending (7.13), we may suppose that there exist projections
Q[r1, . . . , rM−1, rM ] ∈ B(M) such that
σO[r1,...,rM−1,rM ](Q[s
1, . . . , sM−1, sM ]) = δr1s1 . . . δrM−1sM−1δrMsM . (7.21)
(7.20) and (7.21) express ω on B(M) as a decoherent decomposition of alternative
observer states. Indeed, in the language of (5.6), Q[r1, . . . , rM−1, rM ] is a decohering
projection for ω on B(M) which reduces ω to σO[r1,...,rM−1,rM ] with probability
ω(Q[r1, . . . , rM−1, rM ]) = appB(M)(σO[r1,...,rM−1,rM ] |ω)
= p[r1, . . . , rM−1, rM ]p[r1, . . . , rM−1] . . . p[r1]. (7.22)
At the level of the full hypothesis, no such simple decomposition into different
alternatives is assumed – indeed, the set B(W ) which corresponds to B(M) depends
on the entire structure of the observer and on the precise manifestation considered,
so that there is no appropriate single set of observables on which different observer
states are defined. The full hypothesis also does not identify single projections like
Q[r1, . . . , rM−1, rM ] which at a stroke reduce ω to the current observed state. (7.20)
– (7.22) are oversimplifications; artifacts of the model of this section.
Nevertheless, in view of the properties of the function app mentioned in section
5, it is necessary, if the hypothesis is to be correct, that, for any individual observer,
there should, for all sufficient small ε > 0, be ε-manifestations ((σm)
M
m=1,W ) for
which each state σm+1 is in some sense a decoherent part of the prior state σm on
B(W ). For this, it is sufficient, in the framework of this section, to replace (7.12) and
(7.13) by a set of equations for each m = 0, . . . ,M − 1 and each r1, . . . , rm−1, rm of
the form
σO[r1,...,rm−1,rm]
∣∣
B(M)
= p[r1, . . . , rm−1, rm, rm+1] σO[r1,...,rm−1,rm,rm+1]
∣∣
B(M)
+(1− p[r1, . . . , rm−1, rm, rm+1])σdO[r1,...,rm−1,rm,rm+1]
∣∣
B(M)
(7.23)
where there exists a projection Q[r1, . . . , rm−1, rm, rm+1] ∈ B(M) such that
σO[r1,...,rm−1,rm,rm+1](Q[r
1, . . . , rm−1, rm, rm+1]) ∼ 1
and σdO[r1,...,rm−1,rm,rm+1](Q[r
1, . . . , rm−1, rm, rm+1]) ∼ 0. (7.24)
(7.23), (7.24), and (5.4) yield
appB(M)(σO[r1,...,rm−1,rm,rm+1] | σO[r1,...,rm−1,rm])
∼ σO[r1,...,rm−1,rm](Q[r1, . . . , rm−1, rm, rm+1])
∼ p[r1, . . . , rm−1, rm, rm+1]. (7.25)
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(7.23) and (7.24) differ from (7.12) and (7.13) not only in that (7.24) is approxi-
mate, but also in that the state σd
O[r1,...,rm−1,rm,rm+1] which expresses
O[r1, . . . , rm−1, rm] not becoming O[r1, . . . , rm−1, rm, rm+1], is not required to be
decomposable into distinguishable and meaningful alternatives. Only in estimating
probabilities will it be necessary to consider more than one alternative simultane-
ously, but even for this, as we shall see in the next section, only a limited range of
alternatives will be relevant at any moment.
The step-by-step, approximate decoherence of (7.23) and (7.24) is much more
plausible than (7.20) – (7.22); indeed it is no more than the approximate decoherence
ubiquitous in localized thermal macroscopic systems. Nevertheless, it would be absurd
to claim that the mere invokation of decoherence, and the replacement of “quantum
probabilities” by “classical probabilities” is, by itself, the solution to all the problems
of quantum theory. The crucial difficulty is not to find structures to which appropriate
“classical probabilities” can be assigned, but to decide which of many such structures
are significant and to find a way of precisely characterizing those structures.
Consider, for example, the theory of consistent histories. There are several simi-
larities between that theory and the hypothesis of this paper. Both theories present
abstract structures which are purported to be sufficient to characterize a “classical”,
“quasi-classical”, or “observed” world. Both theories aim to understand quantum
uncertainties in terms of classical probability theory. Both theories are developments
from conventional quantum mechanics and are built on sets of projections, thought of
as “yes-no” questions. In the hypothesis, these projections are defined in part F. In
consistent histories, consistent families of projections (P 1r1)
R1
r1=0, . . . , (P
M
rM
)R
M
rM=0 on ω
are considered. Such families are required to satisfy some version of the consistency
conditions
ω(P 1r1 . . . P
M−1
rM−1
PMrMP
M
sMP
M−1
sM−1
. . . P 1s1)
= δr1,s1 . . . δrM−1,sM−1δrM ,sM ω(P
1
r1 . . . P
M−1
rM−1
PMrMP
M−1
rM−1
. . . P 1r1). (7.26)
However, in my opinion, consistent history theorists have been far too easily sat-
isfied with the consistency conditions. The core problem with the theory is to explain
why any particular set of histories from the continuum which satisfy (7.26) should be
physically natural, or important, or should apply to us as observers. The consistency
conditions make it straightforward to define sets of numbers which satisfy the axioms
of classical probability theory, but without some fundamental set of histories, it is not
clear what those numbers mean. Probabilities can be defined only after the funda-
mental entities have been identified. Griffiths (1998) attempts to evade this problem
by assuming that the observer is not part of the physical system considered. Under
this assumption, consistent histories is merely a theory of experimental observations;
telling us nothing about ontology. In particular, the problem of understanding the
nature of observers is entirely unaddressed.
In the hypothesis, the fundamental entities are defined as information processing
structures. Then the continuous variations in the possible physical manifestations of
such structures can be dealt with by dealing with all possibilities simultaneously, and
basing the theory not on individual possibilities, but on equivalence classes of them.
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8. A model for private probabilities.
In section 6, two theses concerning the relationship between the probabilities
of the hypothesis and those of conventional quantum theory were introduced and
discussed. It was argued that a modern human observer, who is “typical” in the
probability of the hypothesis, should be aware of a world in which quantum theory
is accepted. In this section, we shall turn to thesis 6.6, and consider a model for the
immediate observation of an individual event.
In section 7, it was shown that the hypothesis is a development of elementary
models of state change in observation, like (7.12) and (7.18), and that it produces
satisfactory probabilities for those models. This is a preliminary step towards thesis
6.6. However, it is only preliminary, because, in fact, the models of section 7 are
not adequate as representations of observation at the neural level. In this section,
a more sophisticated model will be presented. This will be a model for a brain
acquiring possible information over a time period short in conventional terms but
long enough to contain many determinations of switch status – a period long enough
for a single glance, for example. The goal, in this model, is to argue for a more
sophisticated version of a relationship like (5.4) or (7.25) between a fundamental
(hypothesis-defined) probability and the “expected value” of a suitable projection.
This will provide short-term agreement between the probabilities of the hypothesis
and those of conventional theory. By taking the long term as a developing succession
of such “glances”, this agreement can be extended to arbitrary time intervals.
We shall suppose that at some moment an observer predicts, in the sense of
definition 6.4, that the state on some set of observables B is ρ, and that B contains
projections PBa and P
B
b with P
B
a +P
B
b = 1 such that, according to conventional theory,
the outcome of some observation on B will be a with probability ρ(PBa ) and b with
probability ρ(PBb ). The aim is to link these numbers with probabilities defined by
the stochastic process of the hypothesis. We shall begin by analysing the build-up of
information within the brain of the observer. This will uncover many complexities.
One result of those complexities is that any outcome will be be observed in many
different ways – by many different futures of the observer. However, the analysis will
indicate that quantum probabilities can be separated from geometrical and combina-
torial complexities. This will make it reasonable to assume that the complexities will
not bias the outcome.
There are two reasons why single step probabilities in the stochastic process
defined by the hypothesis cannot, in general, be directly equated with the probabilities
assigned to experimental results in elementary quantum mechanics. One has to do
with the number of distinct successors at each step, and the other with the amount
of information recorded in a single step.
There is a radical difference in the counting of successors with the model of (7.18)
and with the application of the hypothesis to more realistic neural models. Underly-
ing (7.18) is the elementary assumption that each distinct successor corresponds to
a distinct orthogonal projection. But, according to the full version of the hypothe-
sis, successors can differ by only seemingly inconsequential alterations in the precise
geometrical pattern of determinations of switch status and this may have essentially
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negligible effect on the corresponding quantum states. I shall refer to such differences
as being “minor”. They arise because of the abstract way in which information is
defined in the hypothesis. For example, according to the hypothesis, two switching
structures may differ by only the time-ordering of a single pair of determinations.
It was proposed in Donald (1990, 1995), that a status determination corresponds a
snapshot of some property of neural membrane which is linked to neural firing and
in Donald (1995), it was estimated that a human brain might have a switching rate
(roughly equivalent to a rate of status determination) as high as 1015 switchings per
second. Then we might consider two situations such that in situation 1, one knows
part of neuron A is firing at spacetime point (t1,xA) and part of neuron B is firing at
space-time point (t2,xB), while in situation 2, part of neuron A is firing at (t2,xA)
and part of neuron B is firing at (t2,xB). If c
2(t1 − t2)2 − (xA − xB)2 > 0, we shall
have different casual information in these two situations, but that difference will be
of negligible neurophysiological relevance if t1 − t2 < 10−4s.
It will be argued in this section that the existence of a multitude of successors
which vary only by minor differences has two important positive effects. One is that
the “probability of extinction” (defined in G8) can be expected to be zero during the
normal functioning of a human brain because the inevitable loss of a priori probability
due to “collapse” to any specific future switching structure will be outweighed by the
existence of a large number of similar structures. The other positive effect is that the
concentration of the possibility of minor differences to time intervals during which
many switch status determinations have already been made allows the existence of a
“present moment” for an observer to be explained; despite the fact that the hypothesis
allows new determinations to be included at essentially arbitrary times.
In Donald (1992), another model (“postulate nine” of that paper) was presented.
In that model, a priori probabilities were defined using observables beyond those
local to the brain of the observer (cf. Definition 6.4), and it was supposed that when
an observer observed, at a macroscopic level, the outcome of an experiment, that
observation would take place within a single step from (in the notation of section 7),
say O[r1, . . . , rM−1, rM ] to O[r1, . . . , rM−1, rM , rM+1]. For a more adequate model,
in which attention is restricted to observables within the brain, we shall have to
take account of the fact that only a tiny amount of information is expressed by each
determined switch status in the brain. The brain is a very noisy system, in which
information is accumulated in small pieces scattered over many parallel channels.
Although, because of the number of different channels, the time required for sufficient
accumulation to distinguish between different outcomes may be quite short, inevitably
there will be a background of many essentially simultaneous determinations which are
irrelevant to the particular observation being studied.
We shall continue to use assumptions 6.2 and 6.3. Indeed given a switching
structure S(M,N, [d, ϕ]), we shall denote by ((σεm)
M
m=1,W
ε) an ε-manifestation for
which ε is sufficiently small to have the properties required by those assumptions.
We shall assume a strong form of persistency (assumption 6.2) by assuming that
if ((σεm)
M
m=1,W
ε) is an ε-manifestation of S(M,N, [d, ϕ]), then, for any successor
S(Mˆ, Nˆ , [dˆ, ϕˆ]) which is relevant to our calculations, we can (ignoring for simplicity
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the re-orderings allowed by B3) find an ε-manifestation of the form ((σˆεm)
Mˆ
m=1, Wˆ
ε)
such that σˆεm = σ
ε
m for m = 1, . . . ,M .
The stochastic process is built on the elementary step from a structure
S(M,N, [d, ϕ]) to an immediate successor S(M ′, N ′, [d′, ϕ′]). To calculate the proba-
bility of this step explicitly, one would need to know the normalization constant
ξ(S(M,N, [d, ϕ])) =
∑
{app(S(M ′, N ′, [d′, ϕ′]) |ω) :
S(M ′, N ′, [d′, ϕ′]) ∈ Ξ(M,N, d, ϕ)} (8.1)
of G8, and so one would need to be able to list all the immediate successors – the
elements of Ξ(M,N, d, ϕ). If the hypothesis is to be successful, then ξ should be
closely approximated by the sum of the a priori probabilities of successors which, for
all sufficiently small ε, have ε-manifestation brain states σ′εM ′ which can be analysed
in classical terms as processing information which is a meaningful continuation of the
information in ε-manifestation brain states σεM of S(M,N, [d, ϕ]). It is at this point
that it is important to be able to rule out the possibility discussed in section 3 of the
future of a human brain being “dominated by the large number of possible ways in
which small numbers of new short-term artificial switches could arise”. Then we have
to consider what sort of classically meaningful continuations arise. Here we turn to
conventional neurophysiology.
Suppose, as discussed in Donald (1990, 1995), that switchings correspond to
changes, linked to neural firing, in some property of neural membrane. A fully func-
tioning brain state σεM will have a very large number of possible meaningful contin-
uations. By part B of the hypothesis, any continuation will correspond either to a
new switch or to a single new determination of the status of an existing switch. For
simplicity, and without essential loss of generality, I shall mainly discuss the latter
case, involving the determination at some moment of the status of a patch of neural
membrane. Where that patch has been, and also where it will be in the short term
future, is largely determined, through part E of the hypothesis, by the geometrical
structure in W ε and the quasi-classical neural structure represented by σεM . Most of
the possible variation, for a given switch, therefore lies in the moment at which the
new status is specified, and, of course, in the actual status.
The hypothesis defines a finite structure. This implies that there are only a finite
number of possible distinguishable “moments” (or equivalence classes of moments) at
which a new switch status can be determined. However, the docket d of S(M,N, [d, ϕ])
carries information which is sufficient to determine a very fine division of times up
to the present moment in the brain. A different docket is defined whenever the
causal relations between any pair of switch determinations is changed. A single new
determination during a period when there are 1015 switchings per second, defines a
different docket d′ for every change of about 10−15 seconds in the instant of that
new determination. On the other hand, there will only be one docket d′ for a new
determination (on a given switch) in the strict causal future of all the determinations
in d.
As far as the classical meaning of the firing pattern of a brain is concerned, a
change of say 10−5 seconds in the instant of a single determination would clearly be a
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“minor” difference. As neural firing changes only on a millisecond timescale, it would
also be “minor” in relation to the local quantum state. Thus many terms in (8.1)
of equivalent meaning will correspond to a new determination during a period when
many other determinations have already been made. Considered together, this large
set of terms will have far higher probability than the comparatively far smaller set
corresponding to a new determination during a period with few other determinations.
However, C13 of the hypothesis acts as a constraint on this process, by requiring
that a switch cannot repeat status more rapidly than it has already changed status.
This constraint means that we cannot continue indefinitely to add new determinations
within a given time period. Taken together, these imply that the past of a switch will
tend to “fill” with determinations until no more can be added because of C13. As a
result, it is reasonable to assume that a developing structure will have a fairly precisely
defined future edge or “present moment” and that there will be a strong tendency
for ensuing determinations to be made close to that future edge. This effect will be
enhanced by the fact that the more determinations are made within a given spatial
and temporal locality within the brain, the more the status of any new determination
within that locality will tend to be fixed by what has already been determined. A
status which is compatible with many neighbouring determinations will have higher
a priori probability than a determination which probes the undecided.
We shall turn now to consider in detail the observation of some stochastic out-
come; in particular, the observation on a set B of either a or b. We are concerned
with the initial acquisition by an observer of sufficient information to determine which
outcome will be seen. That initial acquisition may require many determinations, but
will often appear to take place very quickly – in the first glance – at the level of “pre-
conscious” processing. Guessing at some numbers just for the sake of argument, it
is, I think, not unreasonable, given a switching rate of 1015Hz, to suppose a “present
moment” defined to within a millisecond, which is certainly shorter than the “psy-
chological moment” – and then we might consider information from determinations
made within a millisecond, scattered over 105 neurons (0.1% of retinal cells), during
which perhaps 1012 irrelevant determinations would also be made elsewhere in the
brain.
For a model in which the probability of observing of a given outcome can be
estimated, consider first a single fixed sequence of switching structures
(S(M,NM , [dM , ϕM ]))
MS
M=M0
which is sufficiently long that, by its conclusion, a def-
inite outcome will be known. Suppose that that outcome is a, which happens with
conventional probability ρ(PBa ). When appropriate, ((σ
ε
m)
M
m=1,W
ε
M ), will denote an ε-
manifestation for S(M,NM , [dM , ϕM ]). (The persistency assumption is implicit here,
in that we do not write σεm,M .)
We shall suppose that in this sequence, relevant determinations have been made
at instants Ms for s = 1, . . . , S, and that the other determinations are irrrelevant.
In order to model the build-up of information to the point at which the observed
outcome is definite, we shall begin by modelling each separate relevant determination
using (5.2) and (5.3). This requires the existence of projections which, in the sense
of (5.6), are “decohering” on to the determined statuses.
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We can expect to be able to find projections to characterize particular events
in any sufficiently large quantum system, because, for example, such events will be
characterized by the values of certain observables, and we can then specify those
values using the projections provided by the spectral theorem. The present situation
will certainly be sufficiently large in this sense. The switches discussed in Donald
(1990, 1995) have length scales of order 10−9m or 10−8m. Even a region as small
as (10−9m)3 can have of order 100 thermally-active degrees of freedom in the warm
dense environment of the living brain. The switch size is chosen to allow the existence
of the projections Pn and Qn of C14 which discriminate switch status, but it will be
possible to find projections in B(W εMs) which carry more information about the local
state of the switch than do those projections, because B(W εMs) is much larger than
the algebra to which Pn and Qn are required to belong, and because Pn and Qn are
required to define properties repeated over the whole lifetime of the switch.
Suitable interactions with the environment of a system are sufficient to make a
given projection decohering. In the present situation, the set B(W εMs) specifies states
only in limited substructures of the brain, leaving plenty of local environment into
which any coherence will rapidly disappear. Moreover, switch status represents local
neural firing status and neural firing works as a method of communicating informa-
tion because it is a macroscopic, thermally irreversible, “all-or-nothing” process which
involves transition from one macroscopically-distinguishable metastable status of the
local neural membrane to another. Because of the metastability, status determina-
tion can be expected to have the property assumed in conventional descriptions of
quantum measurement that the determined status will be “amplified” across a wider
region. Such amplification into the environment is more than enough for the required
decoherence.
This means that it is reasonable to suppose that, for each relevant determina-
tion, we can find a projection P s ∈ B(W εMs), which, in the language of (5.6), is
decohering for σεMs−1 on B(W εMs), and reduces σεMs−1 to σεMs . We shall suppose that
BP s, P sB ∈ B(W εMs) for all B ∈ B(W εMs), and that the constraints imposed by part
F of the hypothesis can be modelled by supposing that in becoming aware of the new
determination, the state of the observer changes from σεMs−1 to σ
ε
Ms
where
σεMs = P
sσεMs−1P
s/σεMs−1(P
s). (8.2)
We shall also suppose that, for s = 1, . . . , S,
σεMs−1(P
sB) = σεMs−1(BP
s) for all B ∈ B(W εMs). (8.3)
Even if the assumption of many simultaneous parallel channels is inaccurate
for some particular type of observation, the macroscopic and thermal nature of the
brain will make it reasonable to assume decoherence on a given switch between one
determination and the next. With the same justification, we shall also assume that,
for s = 1, . . . , S, the projections P s all commute.
For s = 1, . . . , S, set Rs = P
1 · P 2 · · ·P s. The commutativity of the P s implies
that the Rs are projections and are independent of the ordering of their components.
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(8.2) and (8.3) imply that, for B ∈ B(W εMs)
σεMs−1(B) = σ
ε
Ms−1
(P sB) + σεMs−1((1− P s)B)
= σεMs−1(P
sBP s) + σεMs−1((1− P s)B(1− P s))
= σεMs−1(P
s)σεMs(B) + σ
ε
Ms−1
((1− P s)B(1− P s)).
By (5.3), this implies that
appB(W ε
Ms
)(σ
ε
Ms
| σεMs−1) = σεMs−1(P s). (8.4)
A significant aspect of (8.4) is that the projection P s is localized to the region s.
Because of this, it is not unreasonable to assume that the expected value σεMs−1(P
s)
does not depend on the irrelevant determinations.
The state at the beginning of the “glance” is σεM0 . Denote this state by ρ. Set
ρ = ρ0 and, mimicking (8.2), define
ρs = RsρRs/ρ(Rs), (8.5)
for s = 1, . . . , S. In (8.5), changes in σεM0 due to irrelevant determinations are omitted
and only the local changes defined by (8.2) are kept.
The commutativity of the P s implies that
ρ(Rs) = ρ(Rs−1P
s) = ρ(Rs−1P
sRs−1) = ρs−1(P
s)ρ(Rs−1)
and hence, by induction, that
ρ(Rs) = ρs−1(P
s)ρs−2(P
s−1) · · ·ρ0(P 1). (8.6)
Now we shall use the locality of the P s to justify replacing σεMs−1(P
s) in (8.4) by
ρs−1(P
s). Making similar replacements for i = 1, . . . , s in (8.6), allows us to model
the situation by supposing that
σεM0(Rs) = ρ(Rs) = σ
ε
Ms−1(P
s)σεMs−1−1(P
s−1) · · ·σεM1−1(P 1)
= appB(W ε
Ms
)(σ
ε
Ms
| σεMs−1)appB(W εMs−1)(σ
ε
Ms−1
| σεMs−1−1) · · · appB(W εM1)(σ
ε
M1
| σεM0).
Using the localization and decoherence of determinations yet again, allows us to
change the moment at which the set of observables B(WM ) is defined. In particular,
we may suppose that, for M =Ms,Ms + 1, . . . ,Ms+1 − 1,
σεM0(Rs) = appB(W εM )
(σεMs | σεMs−1)appB(W εM )(σ
ε
Ms−1
| σεMs−1−1)
· · · appB(W ε
M
)(σ
ε
M1
| σεM0). (8.7)
(8.7) is the conclusion of the first step towards the goal of this section. It equates
a product of a priori probabilities to the expected value of a composite projection. The
product is a factor in the a priori probability of the ε-manifestation ((σεm)
M
m=1,W
ε
M )
of the switching structure S(M,NM , [dM , ϕM ]) for M = Ms,Ms + 1, . . . ,Ms+1 − 1.
All the other terms in the a priori probability are independent of the outcome being
observed. Thus, setting ε = 0,
app(S(M,NM , [dM , ϕM ]) |ω) = σεM0(Rs)wnd1 (a, S(M,NM , [dM , ϕM ]), ω) (8.8)
where wnd1 is some factor which does not depend on the conventional quantum prob-
ability (ρ(PBa )) of the outcome (a) which is observed, although it may depend on the
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nature of the outcome; for example, it will depend on the number (s) of determina-
tions already made, and on the length of time over which those determinations have
been made.
In this situation, we return to the calculation of the normalization constant
ξ(S(M,NM , [dM , ϕM ])) defined by (8.1). For M = Ms,Ms + 1, . . . ,Ms+1 − 1, there
are two types of term in the sum. One type involves successors S(M ′, N ′, [d′, ϕ′])
in which the new determinations are irrelevant to the observed outcome. For these
terms an approximate result of the form
app(S(M ′, N ′, [d′, ϕ′]) |ω) = σεM0(Rs)wnd1 (a, S(M ′, N ′, [d′, ϕ′]), ω)
will continue to hold.
There will also be successors S(M ′, N ′, [d′, ϕ′]) in which the new determinations
are relevant. Now app(S(M ′, N ′, [d′, ϕ′]) |ω) will have a factor like, for example,
σεM0(P
s+1) and will not be of the same form. However, in the sum
ξ(S(M,NM , [dM , ϕM ])) there will be far more terms of the first type than of the second
(for example, a factor of 107 more with the numbers guessed at above). This means
that terms of the second type can essentially be ignored, and that it is reasonable to
write
ξ(S(M,NM , [dM , ϕM ])) = σ
ε
M0
(Rs)w
nsd
2 (a, S(M,NM , [dM , ϕM ]), ω) (8.9)
where wnsd2 is some factor which is not strongly dependent on the conventional prob-
ability.
In the ordinary operation of the brain, the total number of terms in the sum
(8.1) is huge. The suggested number of determinations made within a millisecond,
already shows this, and in calculating (8.1), one would also have to take account of
the number of minor differences in the way in which any given determination might
arise. With (8.4) indicating that, for S(M ′, N ′, [d′, ϕ′]) an immediate successor of
S(M,N, [d, ϕ]), the ratio
app(S(M ′, N ′, [d′, ϕ′]) |ω)/app(S(M,N, [d, ϕ]) |ω)
can be approximated by the conventional probability of some possible impending
neural event, this huge number of terms will ensure that, except in exceptional cir-
cumstances, we shall have
ξ(S(M,N, [d, ϕ])) ≥ app(S(M,N, [d, ϕ]) |ω) (8.10)
with the consequence, according to G8, that there will be no possibility of extinction.
The sequence (S(M,NM , [dM , ϕM ]))
MS
M=M0
is one possible path in the stochastic
process which leads from the original switching structure to a structure in which a
given outcome is known. The probability of that path is a product of the probabilities
of the individual steps given by G8:
Pr((S(M,NM , [dM , ϕM ]))
MS
M=M0
|S(M0, NM0 , [dM0, ϕM0 ]), ω)
=
MS−1∏
M=M0
app(S(M + 1, NM+1, [dM+1, ϕM+1]) |ω)/ξ(S(M,NM, [dM , ϕM ]))
= σεM0(RS)w
nsd
3 (a, (S(M,NM , [dM , ϕM ]))
MS
M=M0
, ω) (8.11)
by induction using (8.8) and (8.9).
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According to (8.11), the probability of an individual path is given by the ex-
pectation in the initial state σεM0 = ρ of a compound projection RS multiplied by
a complicated geometrical and combinatorial factor. ρ(RS) is not necessarily equal
to ρ(PBa ). However, the projection RS does express sufficient information within
the brain to determine the outcome of the observation. This means that, at least
as far as the state ρ is concerned, RS should be a subprojection of P
B
a , or, in
mathematical terms, that ρ(PBa RSB) = ρ(RSB) for all B in some set sufficiently
large to contain all the observables relevant to the present situation, for example,
B(W εM ) ∪ {AC : A ∈ B, C ∈ C(W εM )} (cf. Definition 6.4).
On such a set of observables, RS differs from P
B
a in that it fixes not only the
outcome of the observation, but also the precise neural processing by which that
observation is made. Independence between the internal processing and the cause of
the external event makes it possible to write
ρ(RS) = ρ(P
B
a )w
nd
4 (a, (S(M,NM , [dM , ϕM ]))
MS
M=M0
, ω) (8.12)
where, once again, wnd4 is a factor which, while it may depend on the nature of the
outcome, does not depend on its conventional quantum probability.
Substituting (8.12) into (8.11) gives
Pr((S(M,NM , [dM , ϕM ]))
MS
M=M0
|S(M0, NM0 , [dM0 , ϕM0 ]), ω)
= ρ(PBa )w
nsd
5 (a, (S(M,NM , [dM , ϕM ]))
MS
M=M0
, ω). (8.13)
There are many many paths like (S(M,NM , [dM , ϕM ]))
MS
M=M0
which lead to struc-
tures in which outcome a is known. To calculate the total probability
Pr(a|S(M0, NM0 , [dM0 , ϕM0 ]), ω) of outcome a given the initial structure, we must
sum over all such distinct paths. Following (8.13), the result will take the form
Pr(a|S(M0, NM0 , [dM0 , ϕM0 ]), ω) = ρ(PBa )w6(a, S(M0, NM0 , [dM0, ϕM0 ]), ω). (8.14)
This states that the total probability of outcome a is equal to the conventional prob-
ability of that outcome multiplied by some factor w6 which depends on the number
of ways in which that a can be observed. w6 combines many terms, none of which is
strongly dependent on the conventional probability of a, but this does not allow us
to conclude that the combination also does not depend strongly on the conventional
probability. Here is a caricature of the situation:
example 8.15
A) Consider a discrete Markov chain (Xn)n≥0 with three states a, b, and o. X0 = o.
a and b are sink states on which the process terminates. At each n, the probability
of passing to a (respectively b) is proportional to p (resp. q). The probability of
staying at o is proportional to x. The constant of proportionality is determined by
normalizing the probabilities.
a and b model the outcomes of the observation. Let Fn(a) (resp. Fn(b)) be the
probability of the process terminating at the nth step at a (resp. b). We are interested
in calculating the net probability F (a) =
∑∞
n=1 Fn(a) (resp. F (b) =
∑∞
n=1 Fn(b)) of
the process terminating at a (resp. b).
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Staying at o is a caricature of making an irrelevant determination, so we shall
suppose that x≫ p, q.
Fn(a) =
p
p+ q + x
(
x
p+ q + x
)n−1
,
so that Fn(a) ∼ p/x for x/(p+ q)→∞. (This caricatures (8.11).)
F (a) =
∞∑
n=1
p
p+ q + x
(
x
p+ q + x
)n−1
=
p
p+ q
.
If p corresponds to ρ(PBa ) and q to ρ(P
B
b ) then we would have p+ q = 1, and it
would be the case that F (a) would be proportional to p with a constant of propor-
tionality (1) independent of p. We would also have F (a)/F (b) = p/q.
A variation in the example, however, shows that this is, in general, too simple a
conclusion.
B) Suppose that there are two sink states a1 and a2 which model distinct ways in
which the outcome a might be observed. Suppose that the probability of passing to
either of these states is proportional to p (with the same constant of proportionality)
Now we have F (a) =
2p
2p+ q
. In this case, F (a)/p =
2
p+ 1
is strongly dependent
on p and F (a)/F (b) = 2p/q.
C) For a slightly more realistic model, suppose that there are many distinct states
ai, i = 1, . . . , Na, corresponding to outcome a and many distinct states bj, j =
1, . . . , Nb, corresponding to outcome b, and suppose that different weights are allowed
for each state, so that the probability of passing from o to ai (resp. to bj , to o) is
w(ai)p/W (resp. w(bj)q/W , x/W ) where W =
∑
iw(ai)p+
∑
j w(bj)q + x.
This gives F (a)/p =
Wa
Wap+Wbq
and F (a)/F (b) = Wap/Wbq where Wa =∑
i w(ai) and Wb =
∑
j w(bj).
Returning to (8.14), we have
Pr(a|S(M0, NM0 , [dM0 , ϕM0 ]), ω)
Pr(b|S(M0, NM0 , [dM0 , ϕM0 ]), ω)
=
ρ(PBa )w6(a, S(M0, NM0 , [dM0 , ϕM0 ]), ω)
ρ(PBb )w6(b, S(M0, NM0 , [dM0 , ϕM0 ]), ω)
.
We wish to argue that
Pr(a|S(M0, NM0 , [dM0, ϕM0 ]), ω)
Pr(b|S(M0, NM0 , [dM0, ϕM0 ]), ω)
=
ρ(PBa )
ρ(PBb )
and this of course would follow if
w6(a, S(M0, NM0 , [dM0 , ϕM0 ]), ω) = w6(b, S(M0, NM0 , [dM0, ϕM0 ]), ω). (8.16)
(8.16) will hold if there is a correspondence between the ways in which out-
come a can be observed, and the ways in which outcome b can be observed. For
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example, a sufficient condition for (8.16) is that there should be a bijection λ be-
tween sequences (S(M,NM , [dM , ϕM ]))
MS
M=M0
leading to observation of a and sequen-
ces λ((S(M,NM , [dM , ϕM ]))
MS
M=M0
) leading to b such that
wnsd5 (b, λ((S(M,NM , [dM , ϕM ]))
MS
M=M0
), ω)
= wnsd5 (a, (S(M,NM , [dM , ϕM ]))
MS
M=M0
, ω).
The construction of (8.13) suggests that this is not an unreasonable assumption;
although it will be open to refutation in specific cases by detailed analysis of the
precise modes of observation of the possible outcomes. In section 6, it was noted
that the hypothesis of this paper differs from the version of Donald (1995), in a way
designed to make such an “indifference assumption” more plausible.
We are investigating a situation which, in conventional terms, has only two out-
comes a and b. This means that, to a high degree of accuracy,
Pr(a|S(M0, NM0 , [dM0 , ϕM0 ]), ω) + Pr(b|S(M0, NM0 , [dM0 , ϕM0 ]), ω) = 1.
It follows from this, and the fact that ρ(PBa ) + ρ(P
B
b ) = 1, that, if (8.16) holds,
then
Pr(a|S(M0, NM0 , [dM0 , ϕM0 ]), ω) = ρ(PBa )
and Pr(b|S(M0, NM0 , [dM0 , ϕM0 ]), ω) = ρ(PBb ). (8.17)
(8.17) is the result we have been aiming at. It is an exact form of thesis 6.6. It
shows that under suitable circumstances, the stochastic process proposed in the hy-
pothesis can define “private” probabilities which are equal to the expected values of
appropriate projections, and it illustrates the claim that the hypothesis is a general-
ization of conventional quantum mechanics which provides a complete theory within
which the probabilistic role of such “public” expected values can be explained.
However, this section has also shown that the detailed analysis of neural pro-
cessing in terms of the hypothesis is far from simple. As a result, there are many
ways in which (8.17) may break down. Reactions to such a breakdown might include
abandoning the hypothesis, trying to modify it, or searching for experimental verifi-
cation. And yet even if such verification were to be found, with the sort of bizarre
properties described in section 6, it would not necessarily be anything more than a
demonstration of an “observer-effect” with a quite conventional interpretation. For
example, no matter how often it has been placed in the infernal apparatus, no cat will
remember having heard the cynanide flask in Schro¨dinger’s experiment break more
than once. Even in conventional terms, the details of neural processing are extremely
complex and unpredictable. Subtle observer-effects, explicable in terms of sensory
limitations or attention to the biologically significant, are inevitable.
As individuals, we rarely conduct our own personal tests of quantum theory;
certainly not in the conditions and with the repetitions required for the collection of
significant statistics. Thus what may be most important about the arguments for
(8.17) is that they make it plausible that the hypothesis correctly reflects the rough
probabilities of everyday experience (“X always/ usually/ sometimes/ seldom/ never
happens”). In particular, this applies to the high probabilities needed in section 6 to
confirm thesis 6.5.
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9. Physics without any physical constants.
The hypothesis proposes an abstract characterization of the set of all possible
structures for an observer, together with a definition of a stochastic process on that
set, defined in terms of an a priori probability of existence for each structure. In this
section, we shall consider the nature of reality in the light of this proposal, and reflect
on the possibility of changing the definition of a priori probability so as to provide
a formalism for a physics in which physical constants are not fixed a priori, but are
indeterminate until observed. It will turn out that such a formalism will only be
satisfactory if the initial conditions of the universe can be given a simple description,
but as will be discussed, this requirement does not seem incompatible with current
observational evidence.
The idea that the physical constants we measure are observed from a range of
possibilities is not new, as can be seen from discussion and references in Barrow and
Tipler (1986 – in particular, §4.6), but the formalism proposed here gives a detailed
technical framework for the idea. It has always been the case that quantum theory
has suggested ways in which our beliefs about the nature of reality might be altered.
A central purpose throughout the present work has been the investigation of the
possibility, at the level of serious theoretical physics, of some of the more radical of
these suggestions.
The fundamental set of entities considered in this paper is the set of minimal
switching structures. Denote this set by SM. Any possible observer at any moment
corresponds to a unique element s = S(M,N, [d, ϕ]) ∈ SM, and G7 defines the a
priori probability app(s |ω) of existence of that element.
Any future which can be experienced is the possible future of some observer, so
if we know how to compute the probabilities of all possible futures of all possible
observers, then, at least as far as prediction is concerned, we have a complete phys-
ical theory. In the present theory, conventional physics is certainly involved in the
definition of the a priori probabilities. The definition of app(s |ω) is in terms of the
“universal state” ω and fundamental physical quantities such as Lorentz transforma-
tions and local von Neumann algebras. These are defined by, or in terms of, some
postulated underlying universal quantum field theory. If that field theory changes
then so will the proposed a priori probabilities. For example, the sets of sequences of
quantum states which satisfy the definitions in parts E and F of the hypothesis, will
change with changes in the action of time-translations on those states.
In this section, the dependence of a priori probability on the underlying field the-
ory will be made explicit in the notation by writing F for a possible field theory and
replacing app(s |ω) with app(s | F , ω). For the sake of discussion, it will be assumed
in this section that F is some sort of gauge theory; something like the standard model
or a grand unified theory, with whatever scalar fields are required to drive cosmolog-
ical inflation. In order to discuss possible constraints on ω, cosmological arguments
involving curved spacetimes will be invoked. Of course this is inconsistent with the
assumption, in the hypothesis, of Minkowski spacetime, but this inconsistency will
be ignored here. There is no doubt that the present hypothesis is incompatible with
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general relativity. Nevertheless, allowing observer-dependent field theory, and there-
fore observer-dependent time propagation may be a first step towards the possibility
of observer-dependent spacetime geometry. I have considered ways of modifying the
hypothesis in order to allow for such a possibility, but, for the moment, this is un-
finished speculation. I expect that we shall have to be able to encompass some such
possibility before we can make sense of the ultimate true theory of quantum gravity.
Leaving this ambition aside, the framework of this section suggests that, even in the
ultimate theory, it may not be necessary for physical constants to be determined.
According to the present theory, everything we believe about the world, we have
deduced from the pattern of information represented in our unique physical structure
s. That pattern contains our entire neural history. Everything we have taken in
from what we have heard or read exists within that history, and the meaning which
we see in it tells us about our “reality” – the “world” which we “observe”. In that
world, we see physical events and repetitions of such events, and we see our colleagues
seeing and observing and reporting on physical events. From all this information, it
becomes possible for us to estimate probabilities for individual events – there will be
rain before tomorrow, the Tories will not win the next election – and to construct and
learn about physical theories which are compatible with some or most or ultimately
all of what we see. Nevertheless, according to the theory presented here, the “world”
is essentially an illusion; a mental construction.
From the very beginning of quantum theory, the conventional view of reality
has been called into question. It was learnt that a particle cannot be seen to have,
at the same time, both an exact position and an exact momentum. The idea arose
that the properties of a particle might depend on the method by which that particle
was observed. Everett’s formalism went further in denying the conventional view. It
suggested, in the first place, that, although there is an observer-independent physical
reality subject to observer-independent physical laws, that reality was not a “world”
but a much more complex and abstract structure.
To see this, recall Everett’s original many-worlds argument (DeWitt and Graham
(1973) pp 65–68) in its simplest form (cf. (7.1)). Everett imagines a universe consisting
of an observer with wave function ψ observing a system with wave function ϕ. The
total wave function of the universe is then a sum of tensor products of ψ’s and ϕ’s.
If, at the beginning of a measurement, with the observer in some fixed initial wave
function ψ, the system is in an eigenstate ϕa (respectively ϕb) of the operator being
measured, then the observer at the end will be in some definite corresponding wave
function ψa (resp. ψb) and the final total wave function will be ψa⊗ϕa (resp. ψb⊗ϕb).
On the other hand, simply by the linearity of the Schro¨dinger equation, if the initial
wave function of the system is a superposition λϕa + µϕb, then the final total wave
function must be
Ψ = λψa ⊗ ϕa + µψb ⊗ ϕb. (9.1)
Such a superposition does not represent a unique fixed “world” outside the observer,
but two “worlds” (ϕa and ϕb) each relative to possible information gained by the
observer. What is left of observer-independent “physical reality” in this picture is,
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firstly, the global Hamiltonian which provides the time-dependence for Ψ – this corre-
sponds in the present theory to a choice of global quantum field theory F . Secondly,
physical reality determines the probability of the observer seeing “world” ϕa given
that he has seen the experiment set up (this probability is essentially |λ|2). Finally,
the determination of possible physical structures for observers; in other words, the
determination that Ψ should be split as in equation (9.1), and not by any other pos-
sible splitting, is also part of observer-independent physical reality. This aspect was
not considered by Everett but is fundamental in the present theory.
Once we have begun on this path, it becomes possible to go further, without
needing to deny that our observations are shaped by physical laws. One further
step has already been taken in the current hypothesis with the proposal that the
possible physical structure of an observer corresponds at an instant not to a unique
wave-function but to a set of quantum states. Crucial in taking this step is the idea
of defining probability by taking a supremum over possibilities between which the
observer cannot distinguish. This idea pervades the definitions of probability in the
present theory, not only in G5 and G7, but also, and most fundamentally, in G2c, in
the very definition of the a priori probability function.
Suppose that we accept that the set SM does characterize possible observers and
that our lives are characterized by elements s ∈ SM . Suppose also that the laws of
physics are given by something like some sort of gauge quantum field theory; by some
F . The physical constants which we deduce for such a theory (which we shall take
to be part of the definition of F), and the probabilities that it predicts by G7 and
G8 are mutually dependent. Leaving aside the ambitions of string theorists, there
appear to be many different plausible quantum field theories F which would allow
s to exist. For example, it seems possible that the fine structure constant might be
exactly 1137.03601 or that it might be exactly
1
137.03602 . The conventional assumption
is that, whether or not we can discover it, there is a true, absolute, real, and unique
value for the fine structure constant (or for a corresponding free parameter in the
ultimate theory of everything). We estimate that value by assuming that our world
is reasonably probable. Ultimately, we attach most credence to the estimate which is
most likely given all the available evidence. However, a revision to the hypothesis will
show that this conventional assumption also can be denied. The question of whether
the fine structure constant is a rational number, for example, simply may not have
an answer. We may allow merely that our a priori probabilities are determined by a
class of quantum field theories. In this case, app(s | F , ω) is not the absolute a priori
probability of the observer defined by s but instead gives the a priori probability for
that observer to observe the universe with the particular set of physical constants
given by F .
In order to make the revision, suppose that we can identify some suitable class of
quantum field theories; specified, for example, merely by choice of gauge group or set
of possible gauge groups, but with the constants, and even perhaps with the number
of elementary fields, left free. Suppose also that for each element F of the class, we
can choose one or more appropriate “universal states” ω. Denote the set of such pairs
(F , ω) by V. In the hypothesis, A(Λ), τ(x,L), C(W ), B(W ), N (W,E), and N (W ) will
49
all depend on F and hence so will GSO(M,N, d, ϕ) and app(W |ω), which we shall
write as GSOF (M,N, d, ϕ) and app(W | F , ω). Now replace G7 and G8 by
G7′) Define the a priori probability for the minimal switching structure
S(M,N, [d, ϕ]), given the field theory F and the universal state ω, to be
app(S(M,N, [d, ϕ]) | F , ω) = sup{app(W | F , ω) : W ∈ GSOF (M,N, d′, ϕ′)
where SO(M,N, d′, ϕ′) ∈ S(M,N, [d, ϕ])}.
G8′) Define the a priori probability for the minimal switching structure S(M,N, [d, ϕ])
given the class V of field theories and states, to be
app(S(M,N, [d, ϕ]) | V) = sup{app(S(M,N, [d, ϕ]) | F , ω) : (F , ω) ∈ V}.
G9′) Use G8′ to define a classical discrete Markov process on the space of minimal
switching structures S(M,N, [d, ϕ]).
Set ξ =
∑
{app(S(M ′, N ′, [d′, ϕ′]) | V) : S(M ′, N ′, [d′, ϕ′]) ∈ Ξ(M,N, d, ϕ)}.
Define the probability of moving from S(M,N, [d, ϕ]) to an immediate successor
S(M ′, N ′, [d′, ϕ′])
to be app(S(M ′, N ′, [d′, ϕ′]) | V)/ξ, if ξ ≥ app(S(M,N, [d, ϕ]) | V),
and to be
app(S(M ′, N ′, [d′, ϕ′]) | V)/app(S(M,N, [d, ϕ]) | V), if ξ < app(S(M,N, [d, ϕ]) | V).
Define the probability of extinction to be 0 if ξ ≥ app(S(M,N, [d, ϕ]) | V), and
to be 1− ξ/app(S(M,N, [d, ϕ]) | V) otherwise.
The essence of this modification is to add a choice of F to the definition
((σm)
M
m=1,W ) of an individual manifestation of a switching structure. With the
modification, the theory answers the question of what the most likely values are for
the coupling constants and the particle masses, given the observer’s experience, in
exactly the same way in which it answers the question of what will be the most
likely future experiences of the observer. G8′ simply broadens the supremum over
observationally-indistinguishable possibilities. In particular, this means that there is
no need to postulate a prior distribution on V.
The conceptual advantage to this approach is the potential disappearance of
arbitrary initial conditions and arbitrary parameters. In a deterministic theory, all
the complexity of everything which will happen has to be present from the beginning
of time. In the proposed revised theory, it is possible to imagine that the set V might
have a comparatively simple description – for example, that there is a gauge group
and a thermal equilibrium state – in which case there will be very little constraint on
what could have happened, and the constraints on what can happen will come almost
entirely from what has been experienced.
Without a complete theory of quantum cosmology, it is impossible to be precise
about V. Nevertheless, V cannot be arbitrary. G7′, G8′, and G9′, and G7 and
G8 represent different proposals about the fundamental physical laws. Each different
choice of V also corresponds to a different proposal and these proposals have empirical
consequences. For a given plausible quantum field theory F , V cannot contain all pairs
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of the form (F , ω), because, if it did, the most likely choice for ω would be highly
time-dependent; highly dependent on the observations which have been made; and the
a priori probabilities defined by the hypothesis would not agree with those predicted
from previous observations. This is best demonstrated by an elementary example:
example 9.2 Suppose that an observation with two possible outcomes (a and b) has
been made on many similar systems all of which we expect to be in identical states,
and that we wish to predict probabilities for the outcomes of the next observation.
Suppose that after T observations (with T large) a has been seen around 0.2T times
and b around 0.8T times. A simple quantum mechanical model proposes that an
operator of the form u|ϕa><ϕa| + v|ϕb><ϕb| with ϕa orthogonal to ϕb and u 6= v
is being measured. An elementary model for the relevant aspects of ω would involve
a set of independent Hilbert spaces Hsys1 , Hsys2 , . . .HsysT external to the observer,
one for each observation, (cf. (7.15) and example 6.7). Then we might expect that
ω
∣∣
B(Hsys1 )⊗B(Hsys2 )⊗...⊗B(HsysT )
=
2∑
r1=1
2∑
r2=1
. . .
2∑
rT=1
pr1pr2 . . . prT
|ϕr1><ϕr1 | ⊗ |ϕr2><ϕr2 | ⊗ . . .⊗ |ϕrT><ϕrT | (9.3)
where, for each t, if rt = 1 then prt = 0.2 and ϕrt corresponds to ϕ
a while if rt = 2
then prt = 0.8 and ϕrt corresponds to ϕ
b, so that, in the language of example 6.7,
the right hand side of (9.3) is equal to (0.2|ϕa><ϕa|+ 0.8|ϕb><ϕb|)T .
This is satisfactory both as a model for the first T observations, and, by extension,
for subsequent prediction.
In the framework of G7′ – G9′, a modification of definition 6.1 would allow us to
define an ε-manifestation of a structure S(M,N, [d, ϕ]) as a sequence
((σεm)
M
m=1,W
ε,Fε, ωε) which comes sufficiently close to attaining all the relevant
suprema. If S(M,N, [d, ϕ]) is sufficiently complex that, for all sufficiently small ε,
Fε is well-characterized, and if, given F , the choice of ω is highly restricted, then
(9.3) may be a plausible model for restrictions of ωε to previously entirely unobserved
systems, such as we might imagine sometimes observing in astronomy. In these cir-
cumstances, the suggestion is that, in the language of a suitably modified form of 6.4,
the predicted state on each system B(Hsyst), prior to its observation, will be close to
ωε|B(Hsyst ), and our suppositions that the initial states of the systems are all identical
and that outcome a has probability 0.2, would be inductively-confirmed cosmological
hypotheses.
However, if, for given F , a supremum over arbitrary ω were allowed, then (9.2)
could be replaced by
ω
∣∣
B(Hsys1 )⊗B(Hsys2 )⊗...⊗B(HsysT )
= |ϕr1><ϕr1 | ⊗ |ϕr2><ϕr2 | ⊗ . . .⊗ |ϕrT><ϕrT |.
(9.4)
where in this case ϕrt would correspond to ϕ
a if a had been the outcome of observation
t and ϕb if b had been the outcome. If, as in this elementary model, it is possible for ω
to shadow each new piece of information, then the supremum in G8′ would be unity,
independent of the actual observations. With the normalization of probabilities, G9′
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would then imply that the outcome of the next observation would be a with probability
0.5 and b with probability 0.5. This would be absurd.
The idea of this section is to introduce a formalism which allows the field theory
F to adjust to match the observation of physical constants. However, each observation
of a given constant will be probabilistically constrained, in a sense precisely defined
by G9′, by all previous observations. Anthropic arguments show how such constants
can often effectively be observed, and to quite surprising degrees of accuracy, by our
mere existence. On the other hand, example 9.2 indicates that if we were to permit ω
to adjust to match the result of each new observation, then G7′ – G9′ would produce
probabilities in conflict with observed statistics. This problem can be avoided if,
for each choice of F , we can define a suitable limited set of fixed possibilities for ω.
However, unless this set can be given a simple and satisfying definition, there would
be little point in introducing G7′ – G9′ just to avoid the arbitrariness of an exact
definition of constants. Simple definitions which avoid the problem raised by 9.2 will
correspond to initial conditions which are by and large purged of information.
The most attractive proposal for V is that ω should be the (or a) ground state
of F (Tryon (1973)). Albert (1988) made such a proposal in the context of a many-
minds interpretation but according to his theory the proposal was without empirical
consequence. The present interpretation provides a much more sophisticated analysis
of probability, and now the proposal is an empirical postulate about cosmology. It is
about cosmology, because to discover ω we need to undo each observed “wave-packet
collapse”; we need to go back to the state of the universe prior to any observation.
Although the present interpretation is based on the idea that only the observations
of each separate observer are relevant, so that ω is only observed during the lifetime
of an observer, this does not imply that ω can be modelled by the sort of state which
we would conventionally assign to the universe at the moment of an observer’s birth.
Such a conventional assignment refers only to the “observed world” constructed by
the observer, and many of the observed events in it, like supernovae explosions, are
represented as being in the distant past. To undo the “collapse” by which we see a
supernova explode at some particular instant in some particular galaxy, we need to
go back in our observed world to before the observed event occured. The conclusion
of this process is that the state assigned by cosmologists to the very early universe
should be a satisfactory model for ω.
At least in inflationary cosmology, the idea that the initial state of fields other
than gravity might be some sort of vacuum is certainly taken very seriously: “a non-
vacuum initial state contradicts the whole spirit of the maximally symmetric initial
state of the Universe which lies at the heart of the inflationary scenario” (Lesgourgues,
Polarski, and Starobinsky (1997)). Quite general maximally symmetric states might
also be considered. For example, assuming a background spacetime with a sufficiently
large symmetry group (e.g. de Sitter space – Borchers and Buchholz (1999)), one could
consider the class of homogeneous and isotropic thermal equilibrium states for F . It
is of course not required, in the present theory, that ω should be a pure state, nor
even that it should be “ergodic” in the sense of quantum statistical mechanics (Ruelle
(1969), §6.3). On the largest visible scales, the universe does seem to be remarkably
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homogeneous. Indeed, explaining this apparent homogeneity is one of the central
motivations for inflationary cosmology (Peacock (1999), chapter 11).
Accepting a homogeneous initial state, however, then calls for an explanation
of the inhomogeneities which are so apparent all around us. This can be done on a
descending hierarcy of scales. Scales larger than the visible universe may be relevant
in theories of quantum gravity or of chaotic inflation. On these scales, it is possible
to assume, if necessary, that our observations give us a symmetry-broken part of
some homogeneous, or otherwise simple, total state. On the scale of the visible
universe, inflation attempts to explain the existence of galaxies as quantum vacuum
fluctuations “frozen in” by an early exponential expansion. Finally, on subgalactic
scales, it is permissible to assume homogeneity even at the end of the inflationary era.
This is because, in a quantum mechanical analysis without collapse, for almost all
plausible states at that time, the current state of a galaxy, at a fixed radial distance
from the centre, will be close to a homogeneous mixture and will need to be broken
by observation into a specific pattern of stars, planets, life-forms, and events. This
means that there is no advantage in not assuming that the initial state itself was
homogeneous.
The conventional historical description of the path which has lead from the early
density fluctuation which gave rise to our galaxy to our existence on this partic-
ular planet involves many processes in which observed outcome prediction would
have been impossible under a global quantum theory. These include fluid dynamical
processes involving fragmentation and shock waves in unstable gas clouds, nuclear
processing in turbulent stellar interiors, and the dispersal of the resulting nuclei by
supernova explosions. Global quantum mechanical descriptions of all these processes
would involve local decoherence, and a final state which, locally, contains almost no
trace of any initial state, with the exception of large-scale thermodynamic parameters
and the radial mass distribution. Implicit in a conventional account is a continual
symmetry-breaking sequence of “wave-packet collapses” which keeps individual atoms
well-localized. Decoherence by itself does not break symmetry; only decoherence plus
collapse or observation. In a many-minds theory, apparent symmetry breaking can be
a result of the requirement that an observer have a specific type of structure. Thus
we can suppose that we see the specific constellations that we do, for the same reason
that we see a particle in a bubble chamber move in a specific direction, even if that
particle has arisen in a spherically-symmetric decay process.
When cosmologists try to calculate whether, for example, observational evidence
about the spectrum of inhomogeneities in the cosmic microwave background is com-
patible with particular hypotheses about the quantum field theory of the universe and
its initial state, what they are doing can be interpreted as attempting to constrain
the choice of V. If cosmology were to provide clear evidence that a homogeneous
initial state was unlikely to give rise to the sort of observations that we make – for
example, if the microwave background temperature had turned out to be strongly
direction-dependent – then it might be difficult to find a choice of V which would be
both compatible with observation and simple to describe. At present however, there
does not seem to be any such evidence.
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Given a suitable choice of V, the conceptually radical change from G7 and G8 to
G7′, G8′, and G9′ seems unlikely to have directly observable consequences. This is
because, under both scenarios, we describe our present observations in terms of the
quantum field theory and the initial conditions which best describe our observations.
In my opinion, G7′ – G9′ constitutes the simpler and more attractive theory.
In this section, the choice of V has been discussed under the assumption of the
sort of fixed and symmetrical background spacetime in which equilibrium states can
be defined. This assumption would surely fail in a complete quantum gravity theory.
Nevertheless, as long as cosmology can provide us with a time in the early universe
when the universal state can be given a simple description, it will remain plausible
that a simple description may also be available for the initial states of any complete
theory. The possibility of a simple description in the full theory may also be indicated
by the apparent low entropy of the geometry of the early universe (Penrose (1979)).
If G7′, G8′, and G9′ hold, then the value of, for example, the fine structure
constant is not determined, and, indeed, the fine structure constant does not have a
value. There is no single unique quantum field theory F which governs the physical
structure of every observer. Quantum field theory is observer-dependent. In fact, even
given an observer, the supremum in G8′ need not be attained at a unique F . The
physical universe as we know it has disappeared. It has become a projection from
our experiences, rather than being the arena in which our experiences occur. Our
experiences are possibilities allowed by a set of rules. They still give us a localized
view of “what is really happening”, but this view is much more parochial than we
had led ourselves to believe.
Not everything is illusory. A given human has a switching structure s ∈ SM and
the possible futures of that structure are governed by probabilistic laws. SM and
the probabilistic laws are discovered by trying to make sense of the history presented
by s. To do this, we have to assume, as discussed in section 6, that, given the
probabilistic laws, s is “reasonably typical” as an observer of its type. Although it
is inevitable that such an assumption cannot be precisely defined, and although it is
the nature of probability that it need not be true; nevertheless, the apparent success
and consistency of the deduced laws of physics in explaining our observations does
indicate why it would be reasonable to take such a theory seriously.
10. Conclusion.
An attempt has been made in this paper and its predecessors to present a tech-
nically complete and consistent version of a many-minds interpretation of special-
relativistic quantum field theory. This attempt has revealed some of the issues which
may be relevant to any such project.
At present quantum theory would seem to be our best handle on the weirdness
of reality. It is almost certainly a mistake to expect that that weirdness to be tamed
with yet another search for those hidden variables which would return us once and
for all to the classical physics of our innocence. But it would also be a mistake to
assume that reality is so far beyond our comprehension that all speculation is idle.
Nor should we give up trying to understand how the world is, merely because we might
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be faced with a range of different possibilities, between which we cannot decide. It
is important to know what the options are and to test each separate option as far
towards its destruction as our abilities allow.
The empirical verification of an ever-widening range of aspects of quantum the-
ory has continued for many decades. But a theory can be tested by other means than
direct observation. If, for example, the incompleteness and inconsistency of Copen-
hagen quantum mechanics does not count towards its refutation, then it is hard to see
what could. Of course we can wait indefinitely for something to turn up to explain the
problems, but then we can also wait indefinitely for an explanation for any adverse
experimental result.
This paper is about progress in a many-minds interpretation. It demonstrates
that the many-minds idea is not empty metaphysical speculation, by showing how
the careful analysis of a detailed theoretical program can refine an interpretation
and lead to deeper questions and wider issues. For example, the refinement of the
intrepretation through a precise definition for individual probabilities requires the
discussion of the many probabilistic notions differentiated in section 6, and leads to
the consideration of the details of neural processing in section 8. Another example
is the resolution of the trimming problem, referred to in section 3. This requires the
explanation, again in section 8, of the existence of a “present moment”. Finally, the
attempt, in section 9, to extend the breadth of the interpretation leads to contact with
issues in cosmology. Many further issues are bound to arise, before full compatibility
with a theory of quantum gravity can be attained. However, here the progress may
go both ways, as the development of such a theory will almost certainly depend on
the simultaneous development of a compatible interpretation of quantum theory.
Everett’s many-worlds idea has always been taken fairly seriously because it
seems to fit quite naturally into the mathematics of elementary quantum mechanics.
The current work tests the idea. The test has not been failed, and progress has been
made.
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Appendix A Hypothesis.
The structure of a mind, at a given moment, can be described by a minimal
switching structure S(M,N, [d, ϕ]).
A A minimal ordered switching structure SO(M,N, d, ϕ) is given by:
A1) Two positive integers M (the number of determinations of switch status) and N
(the number of switches).
A2) An M -component ascending docket d. (This defines the spacetime relations
between determinations.)
(A docket is a geometrical structure in spacetime defined as an equivalence class
of ordered sequences (Ai)
M
i=1 of suitable spacetime sets. Two such sequences (Ai)
M
i=1
and (Bi)
M
i=1 will have the same docket if they have the same spacetime, or causal,
arrangement – in other words, if, for every pair i, j, Bi is in the past of/spacelike to/in
the future of Bj exactly when Ai is in the past of/spacelike to/in the future of Aj – and
if one sequence can be continuously deformed into the other while the arrangement is
essentially unaltered. A docket d is “ascending” if and only if (Ai)
M
i=1 ∈ d and i < j
implies that Ai is not in the strict timelike future of Aj .)
A3) A function ϕ from {1, . . . ,M} onto {±1, . . . ,±N}. (|ϕ(m)| = n is to be inter-
preted as meaning that the mth determination is a determination of the status of
switch n. The two possible statuses of that switch are represented by the sign of
ϕ(m).)
A4) Write |ϕ|−1(n) = {jn(k) : k = 1, . . . , Kn}, where jn(1) < jn(2) < . . . < jn(Kn).
(Determination number jn(k) is the k
th determination of the status of switch n. We
shall write j(ϕ)n(k) in place of jn(k) in B to show the dependence on ϕ.)
A5) For each n ∈ {1, . . . , N}, Kn ≥ 4 and there exist k1, k2, k3, k4 with 1 ≤ k1 <
k2 < k3 < k4 ≤ Kn such that ϕ(jn(k1)) = −ϕ(jn(k2)) = ϕ(jn(k3)) = −ϕ(jn(k4)). (A
switch must open and close at least twice if all the constraints imposed below are to
be brought into play.)
B Given M , N , d, and ϕ as in A, define a minimal ordered switching structure
SO(M ′, N ′, d′, ϕ′) to be an immediate ordered successor of SO(M,N, d, ϕ) if and
only either B1 or B2 holds:
B1) N ′ = N and M ′ = M + 1 (there is a single new determination of status on an
existing switch). There exists an order-preserving map f : {1, . . . ,M} → {1, . . . ,M ′}
(m1 < m2 ⇒ f(m1) < f(m2)) such that, for m ≤ M , ϕ′(f(m)) = ϕ(m) (f pre-
serves switch numbers and their statuses), and there exists a sequence (Ai)
M+1
i=1 ∈ d′
such that (Af(i))
M
i=1 ∈ d (the geometric relations of the existing determinations are
unchanged).
B2) N ′ = N+1,M ′ =M+4, and there exists an order-preserving map f : {1, . . . ,M}
→ {1, . . . ,M ′} and a sequence (Ai)M ′i=1 ∈ d′ such that, for m ≤M , ϕ′(f(m)) = ϕ(m)
and (Af(i))
M
i=1 ∈ d. (In this case, a new switch is introduced.)
56
B3) The minimal switching structure S(M,N, [d, ϕ]) is defined by
S(M,N, [d, ϕ]) = {SO(M,N, d′, ϕ′) : d′ is ascending and there exist permutations
pi on M elements and pi′ on N elements
such that d′ = dpi, ϕ′ = pi′ ◦ ϕ ◦ pi,
and pi(j(ϕ′)pi′(n)(k)) = j(ϕ)n(k) for each n and k.
(dpi is the docket defined by (Ai)
M
i=1 ∈ d ⇐⇒ (Api(i))Mi=1 ∈ dpi. B3 identifies structures
which differ only in the labels assigned to switches or to determinations.)
B4) Define a minimal switching structure S(M ′, N ′, [d′, ϕ′]) to be an immediate suc-
cessor of S(M,N, [d, ϕ]) if and only if there exist SO(M,N, d, ϕ) ∈ S(M,N, [d, ϕ]) and
SO(M ′, N ′, d′, ϕ′) ∈ S(M ′, N ′, [d′, ϕ′]) such that SO(M ′, N ′, d′, ϕ′) is an immediate
ordered successor of SO(M,N, d, ϕ).
Let Ξ(M,N, d, ϕ) denote the set of immediate successors of S(M,N, [d, ϕ]).
C The geometrical manifestations of SO(M,N, d, ϕ) comprise the set
GSO(M,N, d, ϕ) of all sequences
W = (x,Λ, θ, (Tn, (tnk)
Kn
k=1, (t
′
nm)
mfn
m=min
, xn(t), Ln(t), Pn, Qn)
N
n=1)
such that, for n = 1, . . . , N ,
C1) x ∈ Λ ⊂ M (Minkowski space). Λ is a spacetime retract. (At any moment,
any switch occupies a Poincare´ transform of the set Λ. The requirement that Λ be a
spacetime retract is a weak restriction on Λ related to the definition of the docket d.)
C2) 0 ≤ tn1 < tn2 < . . . < tnKn ≤ Tn. We shall write Sn for tn1. (The parameter on
the path of switch n runs from 0 to Tn. tnk is the parameter time on that path of the
kth determination of the switch status. The switch is only “active” from Sn but the
path is extended back to parameter 0 to allow comparison between switches.)
C3) 1 ≤ min ≤ mfn. Sn = t′nmin ≤ t
′
n(min+1)
≤ . . . ≤ t′
nm
f
n
≤ Tn. Set t′
n(mfn+1)
= Tn.
(For m = min, . . . , m
f
n, the state of switch n is σm from parameter time t
′
nm until
t′n(m+1))).
C4) The xn(t) are continuous paths in M defined for t ∈ [0, Tn] and with xn(0) = x.
(xn(t) defines the translational motion of switch n.)
C5) The Ln(t) are continuous paths in L↑+ (the restricted Lorentz group) defined for
t ∈ [0, Tn], having a right derivative Ln ′(t+) for t ∈ [0, Tn), and with Ln(0) = 1.
(Ln(t) defines the rotations and boosts of switch n.)
C6) For m = min, . . . , m
f
n and t ∈ [t′nm, t′n(m+1)],
xn(t) = xn(t′nm) +
∫ t
t′nm
Ln(s)un(t′nm)ds where u
n(t′nm) is a four-vector.
(This implies that
dxn
dt
(t) = Ln(t)un(t′nm).)
C7) The un(t′nm) are timelike, future directed, and (u
n(t′nm))
2 = −1. (It follows from
C6 that un(t) =
dxn
dt
(t) has the same properties and that the path xn is timelike,
future directed, and parametrized by proper time t.)
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C8) For m = min, . . . , m
f
n, x
n(t′nm) is in the closure of the causal future of at least
m members of {xn′(tn′k′) : n′ = 1, . . .N, k′ = 1, . . . , Kn′}. (The “collapses” of the
quantum state are “caused” by the determinations and ordered by those causes.)
C9) Set Λn(t) = {xn(t) + Ln(t)(y − x) : y ∈ Λ} for t ∈ [0, Tn]. Set Ajn(k) = Λn(tnk).
Then (Am)
M
m=1 has docket d.
(Λn(t) is the spacetime set occupied by switch n at parameter time t, and Ajn(k) is
the spacetime set which it occupies at the moment of its kth determination.)
C10) For 1 ≤ m′, m′′ ≤ M , if y′ ∈ Am′ and y′′ ∈ Am′′ are spacelike separated, then
there is a spacelike path from y′ to y′′ in {y ∈ Λn′(t) : n′ = 1, . . . , N, t ∈ [Sn′ , Tn′ ]}.
(Individuals are spatially connected.)
C11) For any t ∈ [Sn, Tn], the number of elements of
{n′ : n′ 6= n and for some t′ ∈ [Sn′ , Tn′ ], Λn(t) ∩ Λn′(t′) 6= ∅}
(the number of switches whose paths hit Λn(t)) is bounded by a constant C – the
“contact number”. C = 13.
C12) θ : {1, . . . , N} → {(n′, k′, k′′) : n′ = 1, . . . , N, 1 ≤ k′ < k′′ ≤ Kn′} such that
writing θ(n) = (n′, k′, k′′), we have n′ 6= n if N > 1, and ϕ(jn′(k′)) = −ϕ(jn′(k′′)).
Then, for some t′ ∈ [Sn′ , Tn′ ], Ajn(1) is neither in the strict future nor the strict past
of Λn′(t
′). (In F5, the states of switch n will be required to be similar to those of
switch θ(n).)
C13) If k4, k5 ∈ {1, . . . , Kn} with k4 < k5 and ϕ(jn(k4)) = ϕ(jn(k5)) then there
exist k1, k2, k3 ∈ {1, . . . , Kn} with k1 < k2 < k3 and ϕ(jn(k1)) = −ϕ(jn(k2)) =
ϕ(jn(k3)) such that tnk5 − tnk4 ≥ 12 (tnk3 − tnk1). (A status on a given switch cannot
be redetermined until after the elapse of a proper time at least as large as half the
minimum cycle time.)
C14) Pn and Qn are projections in A(Λ) with Pn orthogonal to Qn.
D
D1) Let C(W ) be the von Neumann algebra generated by
{τ(xn(tnk)−Ln(tnk)x,Ln(tnk))(Pn), τ(xn(tnk)−Ln(tnk)x,Ln(tnk))(Qn)
: k = 1, . . . , Kn, n = 1, . . . , N}.
(This is the algebra of correlations of switch projections experienced by the observer.
If (x, L) is a Poincare´ transformation which acts to send the spacetime set Λ to
(x, L)Λ = {x + Ly : y ∈ Λ}, then τ(x,L) is the corresponding transformation on
observables, so that, for A ∈ A(Λ), τ(x,L)(A) ∈ A((x, L)Λ). Transformations on
states σ will be defined so that τ(x,L)(σ)(τ(x,L)(A)) = σ(A), implying that if σ is a
state on A((x, L)Λ), then τ−1(x,L)(σ) is a state on A(Λ).)
D2) Let B(W ) be the norm closure of the linear span of
{A1C1 + C2A2 : A1, A2 ∈ A(Λn(t)), C1, C2 ∈ C(W ), t ∈ [Sn, Tn], n = 1, . . . , N}.
(This is the set of all observables accessible to the observer. Elements of C(W ) are
correlated with local observables along the paths of the switches.)
D3) A quantum state ρ on B(H) – the set of all bounded operators on a Hilbert space
H – is a positive linear functional of unit norm on the set B(H). (Thus ρ(AA∗) ≥ 0 for
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all A ∈ B(H) and ρ(1) = 1. A density matrix ρ =∑∞n=1 rn|ψn><ψn| defines a state
(referred to as a “normal” state) on B(H) by ρ(A) = tr(ρA) =∑∞n=1 rn<ψn|A|ψn>.)
For B ⊂ B(H), a state ρ on B is the restriction to B of some state ρ′ on B(H). (This
is written ρ = ρ′|B.)
E defines the set of sequences of states for which xn(t) is the path along which
change of state is locally minimized. E1 requires that the states be such that the initial
conditions un(t′nm) and L
n ′(t′nm
+) are optimal and E2 requires that the continuation
at parameter t is optimal.
E N (W,E) is the set of all sequences of restrictions to B(W ) of sequences of quantum
states (σm)
M
m=1 which satisfy the following requirements for each n ∈ {1, . . . , N} and
each m such that min ≤ m ≤ mfn,
E1) Set
Xnm = {(L,v) : L is a C1 path in L↑+ on some interval
[t′nm, t
′
nm + ε) with ε > 0 and with L(t
′
nm) = L
n(t′nm), and
v is a future-directed four-vector satisfing (v)2 = −1}.
For (L, v) ∈ Xnm, define fnm(s, L, v) = τ−1(ynm(s,L,v),L(s))(σm)|A(Λ) where
ynm(s, L, v) = xn(t′nm) +
∫ s
t′nm
L(s′)vds′ − L(s)x.
Then we require that fnm(s, L
n, un(t′nm)) has a right derivative at s = t
′
nm and that
inf{ lim sup
h→0+
||(fnm(t′nm + h, L, v)− fnm(t′nm, L, v))/h || : (L, v) ∈ Xnm}
is attained when L′(t′nm
+) = Ln ′(t′nm
+) and v = un(t′nm).
E2) For each t ∈ (t′nm, t′n(m+1)), set
Xnt = {L : L is a C1 path in L↑+ on some interval [t, t+ ε) with
ε > 0, and L(t) = Ln(t)}.
(Xnt and X
nm could be replaced by finite dimensional sets defined in terms of
the Lie algebra of L↑+.)
For L ∈ Xnt , define ft(s, L) = τ−1(ynt (s,L),L(s))(σm)|A(Λ) where
ynt (s, L) = x
n(t) +
∫ s
t
L(s′)un(t′nm)ds
′ − L(s)x.
Then we require that ft(s, L
n) has a right derivative at s = t and that
inf{ lim sup
h→0+
||(ft(t+ h, L)− ft(t, L))/h || : L ∈ Xnt }
is attained when L′(t+) = Ln ′(t+).
F1 – F4 are the formal expression for the idea that “A switch is something
spatially localized, the quantum state of which moves between a set of open states
and a set of closed states, such that every open state differs from every closed state
by more than the maximum difference within any pair of open states or any pair
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of closed states.” F5 is a requirement of “homogeneity”; allowing only for gradual
change between different switches.
F Set
σnk = τ
−1
(xn(tnk)−Ln(tnk)x,Ln(tnk))
(σn(tnk))|A(Λ)
where σn(t) is the state of switch n at parameter time t, which is defined to be σmn(t)
for mn(t) = sup{m′ ≤ mfn : t ≥ t′nm′}.
Then N (W ) is the subset of N (W,E) consisting of sequences (σm)Mm=1 such that, for
each n ∈ {1, . . . , N} and for k, k′ ∈ {1, . . . , Kn},
F1) σnk(Pn) >
1
2 for ϕ(jn(k)) > 0. (“a set of open states”)
F2) σnk(Qn) >
1
2
for ϕ(jn(k)) < 0. (“a set of closed states”)
F3) |σnk(Pn) − σnk′(Pn)| > 12 and |σnk(Qn) − σnk′(Qn)| > 12 for all pairs k and k′
such that ϕ(jn(k))ϕ(jn(k
′)) < 0. (“every open state differs from every closed state”)
F4) There is no triple (P, k, k′) with P ∈ A(Λ) a projection and k and k′ satisfy-
ing ϕ(jn(k))ϕ(jn(k
′)) > 0 such that |σnk(P ) − σnk′(P )| ≥ 12 . (“by more than the
maximum difference within any pair of open states or any pair of closed states.”)
F5) If θ(n) = (n′, k′, k′′), then there are no projections P ∈ A(Λ) such that either
|σn1(P )− σn′k′(P )| ≥ 12 or |σn2(P )− σn′k′′(P )| ≥ 12 .
G
G1) The set of manifestations of the minimal switching structure S(M,N, [d, ϕ]) is
{((σm)Mm=1,W ) :W ∈ GSO(M,N, d′, ϕ′) and (σm)Mm=1 ∈ N (W ),
for SO(M,N, d′, ϕ′) ∈ S(M,N, [d, ϕ])}.
G2) For σ and ρ quantum states on a set of operators B, a function appB(σ | ρ) which
gives “the probability, per unit trial of the information in B, of being able to mistake
the state of the world on B for σ, despite the fact that it is actually ρ” is defined by
appB(σ | ρ) = exp{entB(σ | ρ)}
where entB(σ | ρ) (the relative entropy of σ with respect to ρ on B) is the unique
function satisfying
a) entB(H)(σ | ρ) = tr(−σ log σ + σ log ρ) for σ and ρ normal states on B(H).
b) entB(H)(σ | ρ) = inf{F (σ, ρ) : F is w* upper semicontinuous, concave, and given
by a) for σ and ρ normal}.
(This is a natural extension of a) to the closure of the set of density matrices in the
w∗-topology.)
c) entB(σ | ρ) = sup{entB(H)(σ′ | ρ′) : σ′|B = σ and ρ′|B = ρ}.
G3) The a priori probability of a sequence (σm)
M
m=1 of states on a set B, given an
initial state ω, is defined by
appB((σm)
M
m=1 |ω) =
M∏
m=1
appB(σm | σm−1) where σ0 = ω.
G4) For m = 1, . . . ,M , define
Nm(W ) = {(σi)mi=1 : ∃(σi)Mi=m+1 with (σi)Mi=1 ∈ N (W )}.
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G5) Define, by induction on m, the following a priori probabilities. Start with
app(N (W ),B(W ), 1, ω) = sup{appB(W )(σ |ω) : σ ∈ N 1(W )}.
Then, for 1 < m+ 1 ≤M , set
app(N (W ),B(W ), m+ 1, ω) = sup{lim sup
n→∞
appB(W )((σ
n
i )
m+1
i=1 |ω) : ((σni )m+1i=1 )n≥1 is
a sequence of elements of Nm+1(W ) and, for 1 ≤ k ≤ m,
appB(W )((σ
n
i )
k
i=1 |ω)→ app(N (W ),B(W ), k, ω)}.
G6) Define the a priori probability app(W |ω) of existence of an individual geometric
manifestation W ∈ GSO(M,N, d, ϕ) by
app(W |ω) = app(N (W ),B(W ),M, ω).
G7) Define the a priori probability for the minimal switching structure S(M,N, [d, ϕ])
to be
app(S(M,N, [d, ϕ]) |ω) = sup{app(W |ω) :W ∈ GSO(M,N, d′, ϕ′)
where SO(M,N, d′, ϕ′) ∈ S(M,N, [d, ϕ])}.
(This takes account of the re-labellings allowed by B.)
G8) Use G7 to define a classical discrete Markov process on the space of minimal
switching structures S(M,N, [d, ϕ]).
Set ξ =
∑
{app(S(M ′, N ′, [d′, ϕ′]) |ω) : S(M ′, N ′, [d′, ϕ′]) ∈ Ξ(M,N, d, ϕ)}.
Define the probability of moving from S(M,N, [d, ϕ]) to an immediate successor
S(M ′, N ′, [d′, ϕ′])
to be app(S(M ′, N ′, [d′, ϕ′]) |ω)/ξ, if ξ ≥ app(S(M,N, [d, ϕ]) |ω),
and to be
app(S(M ′, N ′, [d′, ϕ′]) |ω)/app(S(M,N, [d, ϕ]) |ω), if ξ < app(S(M,N, [d, ϕ]) |ω).
Define the probability of extinction to be 0 if ξ ≥ app(S(M,N, [d, ϕ]) |ω), and
to be 1− ξ/app(S(M,N, [d, ϕ]) |ω) otherwise.
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